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Rules of inheritance and succession are, in a way, the genetic code 
of a society.  They guarantee that the next generation will, more or 
less, have the same structure as the one that preceded it.1 
  – Lawrence M. Friedman 
Today’s most serious racial injustices . . . are a legacy of past 
racism . . . .  [T]he biggest racial problem facing the country isn’t 
discrimination, but rather the deep inequality that has created almost 
two different Americas . . . .2 
  – Richard Thompson Ford 
ince first reading the Friedman quote above,3 I have carried with 
me an image of a legal double helix through which our society 
replicates itself generation after generation according to the encoded 
instructions of the law of succession and inheritance.  Though 
mutations and evolution occur, essential patterns remain over time.  
Further, while the patterns of society emerge from law, law in turn 
emerges from social norms.4 
In Friedman’s recent book, Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, 
Trusts, and Inheritance Law,5 he tracks specific trends in inheritance 
law that reflect changed social norms.  He identifies shifts in law and 
social norms that accommodate nontraditional families and a shift 
from the “bloodline family” to the “family of affection and 
dependence,”6 movement away from formal wills toward will 
substitutes,7 and changing attitudes toward wealth and the wealthy.8  
 
1 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, 
TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 9, 14 
(Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed., 1977). 
2 Richard Thompson Ford, The End of Civil Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/05/17/the_end_of_civil_rights 
/?mo. 
3 See Friedman, supra note 1. 
4 “Laws of inheritance reflect . . . the social background and the social structure.  They 
are the product of society.  But they also perform a function for society.  These laws and 
rules help define, maintain, and strengthen the social and economic structure.”  Friedman, 
supra note 1; see also Palma Joy Strand, Law as Story: A Civic Concept of Law (with 
Constitutional Illustrations), 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 603, 611–15 (2009) (describing 
the cycle by which community experiences and stories lead to law, which in turn leads to 
social norms). 
5 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND INHERITANCE LAW (2009). 
6 Id. at 11–13, 19–27. 
7 Id. at 13, 58–68, 100–10. 
8 Id. at 14, 171–78. 
S
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Friedman also notes, but does not discuss, significant demographic 
changes due to people living longer and the increasing importance of 
lifetime transfers of wealth for big-ticket items such as college costs 
and down payments on homes.9 
Of course, the social structure that is most directly affected by the 
law of inheritance—which determines who receives people’s property 
when they die—is the distribution of property, of wealth.  This 
Friedman does not discuss.10  But his metaphor prompted me to 
explore the effects of inheritance law on the distribution of wealth in 
the United States.  This Article is the result. 
Following the thread of inheritance law, I started with current 
wealth inequality, which—after falling from its twentieth century 
peak in the 1920s to a low point around 1980—has increased steadily 
in recent decades.11  Further exploration led to the particularly acute 
wealth disparities between Black and White12 households as well as 
studies documenting the effect of inheritance in perpetuating those 
disparities.  This is an issue of immediate urgency: The wave of 
racialized wealth owned by the parents of the baby boom generation 
is currently washing over the baby boomers in an enormous 
intergenerational transfer of wealth.13  Without intervention, the 
 
9 Id. at 13; see also John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family 
Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988) (arguing that middle-class families 
now transmit wealth during the parents’ lifetime in the form of human capital rather than 
at death via provisions of physical capital). 
10 Friedman does refer to it in passing, FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 14, 135, but he does 
not address it in any comprehensive way.  Although Friedman devotes a large portion of 
the book to a discussion of topics relevant especially to those with enormous wealth 
(dynastic and caretaker trusts and limits on perpetual trusts, charitable foundations, and 
estate taxes), id. at 111–78, he oddly does not articulate a conclusion regarding the 
economic structure that underlies these patterns other than to observe that institutions have 
formidable lobbying power, id. at 134, 182, and to note the public’s conversion to an anti-
estate-tax view as a result of the political campaign against the “death tax,” id. at 176–77. 
11 See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
12 In this Article, the racial terminology I use, except when quoting others, is Black and 
White.  See BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING 
TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?: AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 15–17 
(1997).  I focus on Black and White wealth here because of the amount of available data, 
the acute nature of the disparities, and the historical centrality of Black-White relationships 
in U.S. law and culture.  For an overview of the wealth picture in the United States that 
looks to other ethnic groups as well, see MEIZHU LUI ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: 
THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE (2006). 
13 See, e.g., Melvin L. Oliver et al., “Them That’s Got Shall Get”: Inheritance and 
Achievement in Wealth Accumulation, in 5 RESEARCH IN POLITICS AND SOCIETY: THE 
POLITICS OF WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 69, 73 (Richard E. Ratcliff et al. eds., 1995) 
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wealth distribution going forward will be at least as racially skewed 
as it is at present.  Part I of this Article describes this initial part of my 
journey, including a summary of the relevant provisions of our 
current law of succession.14 
Confronting these racial wealth disparities, I considered both their 
effects and their source.  As to their effects, current work links net 
worth to a host of outcomes including, perhaps most importantly, 
education—a key to success and upward mobility.  As to their source, 
multiple observers trace them to the centuries-old, race-based 
economic system that separated White “haves” and “could-haves” 
from Black “have-nots” and “could-never-haves.”  Slavery and de 
jure segregation were the most evident legal aspects of this system, 
but others such as the Homestead Acts of the late 1800s, the original 
exclusions from Social Security, and federal support for 
suburbanization and White-only neighborhoods after World War II 
were also significant.  Part II discusses these dual perspectives on the 
disparities.15 
Richard Thompson Ford has pointed to “deep inequality”16 rather 
than overt discrimination as the most significant racial problem today.  
The racial wealth disparities described in Parts I and II constitute one 
facet of this problem.  As with others, inheritance law is facially race 
neutral, but individual decisions under inheritance law, operating 
from a starting point of racially skewed wealth, perpetuate deep racial 
wealth inequality.  Ford and others have argued for measures that 
focus on class rather than race per se to address the floundering of 
traditional civil rights law in the face of such problems.  Cross-racial 
alliances and legal initiatives that emphasize common economic 
interests and, paradoxically, de-emphasize race by explicitly 
acknowledging it as a potent social construct offer a path toward 
change.  Part III traces the line of analysis from deep inequality to a 
systemic understanding of that inequality to the cross-racial 
relationships and race-neutral legal initiatives that can move the 
system.17 
I then head back to inheritance law, offering two ideas for 
changing how property passes from one generation to another at 
 
(“Between 1987 and 2011 the baby boom generation stands to inherit an estimated 6.8 
trillion dollars.”). 
14 See infra notes 19–79 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 80–134 and accompanying text. 
16 Ford, supra note 2. 
17 See infra notes 135–66 and accompanying text. 
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death.  Both of these, while race-neutral proposals that would benefit 
all low-wealth individuals and households, would intentionally 
benefit Black individuals and households disproportionately due to 
their overrepresentation in the low-wealth ranks.  Part IV highlights 
(1) a shift to a “windfall” tax on inheritances to change our social 
“story” about inheritance from one in which the decedent is entitled to 
dispose of “his” or “her” property to one that acknowledges the “Lady 
Luck” aspect of being born to a richer or poorer family; and (2) 
changes in intestacy law to provide clear title quickly and easily for 
inherited assets, especially homes in modest estates.18 
Finally, in the Conclusion, I offer some thoughts on how the 
approach I take here, which reflects a systemic rather than an 
individualized understanding of racism and civil rights, meshes with 
other current views on the next steps in the long struggle to overcome 
our continuing legacy of slavery and race. 
I 
WEALTH INEQUALITIES, RACE, AND INHERITANCE 
One of the groundings of our form of government is the absence of 
an aristocracy.  In Britain, political power was passed down through 
inherited titles.  The U.S. Constitution, in contrast, explicitly 
prohibited the granting of titles of nobility by the United States or any 
of the states individually.19 
From the Founding, however, vast accumulations of wealth and the 
economic power that accompanies that wealth have been not only 
allowed, but encouraged by American capitalistic ideals.  Yet, at the 
same time, there is a conviction in American history that 
concentrations of wealth—and in particular the creation of economic 
aristocracies by the inheritance of such wealth over generations—are 
at odds with our democratic project.  One result of this conviction is 
the estate tax, which has historically been justified as a deterrent to 
concentrated wealth rather than in terms of revenue raising.20 
 
18 See infra notes 167–255 and accompanying text. 
19 “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding 
any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, 
accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, 
Prince, or foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.  “No State shall . . . grant any Title 
of Nobility.”  Id. at § 10, cl. 1. 
20 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 172. 
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Apart from the estate tax, however, little attention has been paid to 
the role of the law of inheritance in ensuring—or interfering with—
politically acceptable levels of social mobility.  The focus has been 
primarily on ensuring that the wealthiest citizens, the crème de la 
crème, do not found economic dynasties.  What happens to the rest of 
us has been largely ignored.  My interest is bringing Friedman’s 
insight into sharper focus with respect to this issue by developing a 
more fine-grained picture of the relationships between inheritance and 
the reproduction of our economic structure overall. 
A.  Wealth Inequality 
I start with the distribution of wealth overall.  While many people 
and much of the data on economic well-being have traditionally 
emphasized and continue to emphasize income, “family wealth is also 
a source of well-being, independent of the direct income it 
provides.”21  Income, generally earned by or assigned to individuals, 
is the inflow of resources over a given time and is often offset to a 
large degree by outflows to cover expenses.  Wealth, in contrast, 
represents accumulated assets and often accrues to families.22  Wealth 
provides a level of security to families to meet income fluctuations or 
emergency needs: “Most assets can be sold for cash or used as 
collateral for loans, thus providing for unanticipated consumption 
needs.  In times of economic stress, occasioned by such crises as 
unemployment, sickness, or family breakup, wealth is an important 
cushion.”23  Wealth also allows for family investment in the form of 
education or homeownership. 
Sociologist Seymour Spilerman observes that, until recently, 
wealth was considered relevant only in relation to elites.24  He 
identifies three reasons why this began to change in the 1980s: “(a) an 
emergent appreciation of the contributions of family wealth—even 
 
21 EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN 
AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 5 (2002). 
22 Id. at 2; see also Ron Haskins, Wealth and Economic Mobility, in JULIA B. ISAACS ET 
AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, ECONOMIC MOBILITY PROJECT, GETTING AHEAD OR 
LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 47 (2008), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_economic_mobility_sawhill.aspx. 
23 WOLFF, supra note 21, at 6. 
24 Seymour Spilerman, Wealth and Stratification Processes, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 497, 
500 (2000).  Spilerman also suggests a theoretical underpinning for the historical focus on 
income rather than wealth: theories of stratification that focused on individual merit and 
skill (functionalism) or role in the system of production (Marxian).  Id. at 498. 
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modest financial resources—to living standards; (b) the rapid equity 
buildup in the American population since World War II; and (c) the 
growing availability of wealth data at the level of the family or 
household unit.”25 
As to the first reason, Spilerman notes the ability of even modest 
levels of wealth to “cushion” families, particularly low-income 
families, from economic shocks such as illness or job loss.26  As to 
the second, he observes the general trend for the dispersion of wealth 
in the West over the twentieth century, with even average families 
often possessing home and pension equity.27  Finally, as to the third 
reason, after an initial survey of assets was conducted in the 1960s, 
additional surveys have been consistently performed since the 
1980s.28 
Economic data and sociological analyses have in recent decades 
generated a more complete portrait of wealth distribution in the 
United States than was historically available.  Several characteristics 
of this portrait are noteworthy.  To start, wealth inequality in the 
United States is significantly greater than income inequality.  In 
2004–2005, for example, the top 20% of the income distribution 
received 47.7% of total income but held 84.4% of total wealth.29  
That same year, the bottom 20% received 4.2% of total income and 
held 0% of total wealth.30 
In addition, wealth inequality has been increasing since the late 
1970s or early 1980s.  Economist Edward Wolff observes that “[a]fter 
the stock market crash of 1929, there ensued a gradual if somewhat 
erratic reduction in wealth inequality, which seems to have lasted 
 
25 Id. at 500. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 501, 504–10.  Even though the overall trend toward greater wealth distribution 
reversed in the last decades of the century, id. at 505–06, Spilerman’s writing in 2000 
views non-elites as holding meaningful levels of assets, especially in the form of home and 
pension equity (as versus financial or investment assets).  Id. at 501  (“While the average 
family may have accumulated only modest assets in an investment portfolio or savings 
account, home equity and pension equity have grown by substantial amounts.”). 
28 Id. at 501–02. 
29 Heather Boushey & Christian E. Weller, What the Numbers Tell Us, in INEQUALITY 
MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND ITS POISONOUS 
CONSEQUENCES 27, 39 (James Lardner & David A. Smith eds., 2005) [hereinafter 
INEQUALITY MATTERS]. 
30 Id.  In terms of wealth distribution, 1988 data indicated that the top 1% held 11.6% of 
the nation’s total net worth, and the top 10% held almost half (47.3%).  MELVIN L. 
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 69 tbl.4.1 (1995). 
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until the late 1970s.  Since then, inequality of wealth holdings . . . has 
risen sharply.”31  If Social Security and other types of pension wealth 
are excluded (wealth that benefits the holder but is generally 
extinguished at death and is thus not inheritable), wealth inequality in 
1998 approached wealth inequality in the 1920s.32 
Finally, wealth inequality in the United States is substantially 
greater than in most developed countries.33  This wealth inequality 
echoes U.S. income inequality, which also exceeds that of other 
comparable countries.34 
Looking even more closely at the wealth distribution portrait 
reveals additional details relating to the composition of household 
wealth.  While owner-occupied housing is consistently the most 
important household asset,35 for American households overall it 
accounts for only about a quarter to a third of family net worth.36  But 
for the three middle quintiles of Americans—those who lie between 
the top 20% and the bottom 20% in wealth—the principal residence is 
between one-half and two-thirds of total net worth.37  Unsurprisingly, 
given their overall greater wealth, the principal household residence is 
a significantly lower proportion of total wealth to those at the top of 
the wealth distribution: 7.8% for the top 1% and 28.8% for the next 
19%.38 
The interlocking pieces of the composition-of-assets puzzle can 
also be seen by noting the financial assets that comprise the majority 
of the wealth of those at the top of the distribution: 
Another way to portray differences between middle-class 
households and the rich is to compute the share of total assets of 
different types held by each group.  . . .  In 1998 the richest one 
percent of households held half of all outstanding stock, financial 
securities, and trust equity, two-thirds of business equity, and 36 
 
31 WOLFF, supra note 21, at 8. 
32 Id.  Though these forms of non-inheritable wealth are of the utmost importance to 
particular individuals during their lifetimes, they are less relevant in terms of the 
reproduction of social structure issues of interest here. 
33 See id. at 31–36. 
34 See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY EQUAL 
SOCIETIES ALMOST ALWAYS DO BETTER 15, 19–20 (2009). 
35 WOLFF, supra note 21, at 22; Haskins, supra note 22, at 50 (“[A] bigger share of 
families own their home than any other asset . . . .”). 
36 See WOLFF, supra note 21, at 22. 
37 Id. at 25 tbl.4-2 (For the middle three wealth quintiles, the principal residence 
composed 59.8% of gross assets in 1998.). 
38 Id. 
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percent of investment real estate.  The top 10 percent of families as 
a group accounted for about 90 percent of stock shares, bonds, 
trusts, and business equity, and about three-quarters of nonhome 
real estate.39 
What we see, then, are housing and retirement assets within the 
reach of most Americans.  Financial assets beyond those required for 
daily living costs and a secure retirement, however, are heavily 
concentrated in those at the top, while those at the bottom of the 
income distribution hold essentially no wealth at all. 
B.  Racial Wealth Disparities 
The skewed distribution of wealth described in the previous 
section, in and of itself, has elicited acute concern in terms of its 
effect on the operation of our democracy.  Inequality hurts both direct 
political participation40 and the civic involvement that grounds the 
exercise of citizenship.41  More generally, having an economic stake 
in one’s society has been asserted to correlate to having a stake in the 
society overall.42 
But a final aspect of the wealth distribution portrait clamors for 
attention: The portrait is painted in black and white.  Not only is 
wealth inequality in general relatively high and on the rise in the 
United States, racial trends in wealth inequality are stark.  In 1995, 
Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro used data from the 1980s to 
reveal enormous disparities in racial wealth overall as well as more 
textured differences relevant to family economic resilience.43  They 
showed, for example, that while the ratio of Black median income to 
White median income was 0.62 ($15,630 to $25,384), the ratio of 
Black median net worth to White median net worth was 0.08 ($3700 
to $43,800).44  Even more dramatic, the ratio of Black median net 
 
39 Id. at 24–27. 
40 See Miles S. Rapoport & David A. Smith, Democracy First, in INEQUALITY 
MATTERS, supra note 29, at 268, 272. 
41 See Theda Skopcol, America Disconnected, in INEQUALITY MATTERS, supra note 29, 
at 178, 178–87. 
42 See, e.g., Michael Lind, The Smallholder Society, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 
145–47 (2007). 
43 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 55–56. 
44 Id. at 86 tbl.4.4. 
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financial worth to White median net financial worth was 0.00 ($0 to 
$6999).45 
Probing more deeply, Oliver and Shapiro found that 65.6% of 
White compared to 41.6% of Black households had home equity; of 
those households, the median value of the asset was $45,000 for 
Whites and $31,000 for Blacks.46  At the same time, for Black 
households, which overall hold less net financial worth than White 
households, home equity represented 62.5% of assets overall 
compared to 43.3% for White households.47  Oliver and Shapiro 
identified “three key points at which institutional and policy 
discrimination often intervenes to restrict blacks’ access to housing 
and to inhibit the accumulation of housing wealth”:48 (1) lesser access 
to credit, (2) higher interest rates attached to loans for buying homes, 
and (3) the lesser appreciation of housing values in “Black” versus 
“White” neighborhoods.49  The last point in particular stems from 
historical federal practices (especially housing, tax, and 
transportation) that enforced residential segregation and continuing 
patterns of extremely high levels of racial housing separation.50  
Oliver and Shapiro estimated the cumulative wealth implications of 
these three effects of past and present housing discrimination to be 
substantial.51 
 
45 Id.; see also Spilerman, supra note 24, at 508; WOLFF, supra note 21, at 19–21.  
There is, moreover, evidence indicating that the racial wealth gap has widened over the 
past two decades—at least in absolute terms.  See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO ET AL., INSTITUTE 
ON ASSETS AND SOCIAL POLICY (IASP), RESEARCH AND POLICY BRIEF: THE RACIAL 
WEALTH GAP INCREASES FOURFOLD (2010), available at http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs      
/Racial-Wealth-Gap-Brief.pdf (from $20,000 to $95,000 differential in median net worth 
exclusive of home equity, 1984–2007).  Further, the recent economic downturn may well 
have had more severe effects on Blacks than on Whites.  See, e.g., Barbara Ehrenreich & 
Dedrick Muhammad, Op-Ed, The Recession’s Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/opinion /13ehrenreich.html. 
46 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 106. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 137. 
49 Id. at 137–51. 
50 Id. at 136–37. 
51 See id. at 150–51.  Oliver and Shapiro found that: 
Among the current generation of black homeowners, to the $10.5 billion paid to 
banks in extra interest, one must add another $58 billion in lost home equity.  
Finally, if black home mortgage approval rates were the same as those of 
similarly qualified whites, 8 percent of the blacks who are annually denied 
mortgages would be homeowners today. . . . [D]iscrimination in housing markets 
costs the current generation of blacks about $82 billion.  If these biases continue 
unabated, it will cost the next generation of black homeowners $93 billion. 
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Ten years later, Oliver and Shapiro issued an update of their 1995 
work.  Using data up to 2002, they found that “the overall racial 
wealth gap persists at a dime on the dollar, and the dollar amount of 
the racial wealth gap grew.”52  Surveying the overall landscape, 
Oliver and Shapiro identified several important developments relating 
to the asset gap.  These include the reliance of Black families on 
credit card debt;53 the magnified importance of home equity as it was 
increasingly used to cover such debt and living expenses;54 the higher 
effects of the subprime mortgage market on Black versus White home 
buyers (30% versus 10%);55 changes in bankruptcy law that 
disadvantage families, such as Black families, that have greater health 
problems and medical costs (the greatest cause of individual 
bankruptcies);56 and higher incarceration rates of Black men than 
White men, which ensures that a significant proportion of Blacks will 
be handicapped in lifetime wealth accumulation.57 
Wolff’s 2002 analysis reveals an additional important characteristic 
of the racial wealth gap: The Black-White gap in median wealth is 
greater than the gap in mean wealth.  “This result reflects a greater 
inequality in wealth among blacks than whites.”58  “More than one in 
four African-American households now have no positive wealth at all, 
in contrast to one in seven white households.”59  These data reveal a 
divide between a Black middle class with net worth in the form of 
home equity (though depressed due to lingering effects of past 
discriminatory practices) but with little net financial worth and a 
Black poorer class with little wealth in any form whatsoever. 
 
Id. 
52 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 204 (10th anniversary ed. 2006) (from 
$60,980 in 1988 to $82,663 in 2002); see also WOLFF, supra note 21, at 21.  The home 
ownership rate for Blacks doubled from 24% to 44% between 1940 and 1980—a time 
when federally prescribed lending practices led to lower values for homes in non-White 
neighborhoods.  It has, however, remained at essentially that level since, which means that 
Black home values and net worth continue to reflect a racially segregated market.  Id. 
53 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 52, at 214. 
54 Id. at 216. 
55 See id. at 217–19. 
56 See id. at 220–21. 
57 Id. at 225–26.  On the positive side, Oliver and Shapiro note an increase in attention 
to the importance of wealth as an indicator of equity as well as emerging policy initiatives 
designed to address the issue.  See id. at 229–68. 
58 WOLFF, supra note 21, at 21. 
59 Id. at 3. 
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C.  The Role of Inheritance in Wealth Inequalities 
Awareness of the importance of household wealth as well as 
individual income as an indicator of economic well-being and social 
status has grown over the past twenty years.  Along with this 
awareness, interest has grown regarding sources of wealth and 
particularly the degree to which wealth is inherited or otherwise 
transferred intergenerationally.  Though the inheritance of wealth is 
one likely factor, other causes of observed trends are possible and, 
indeed, likely.  For example, tax and economic policies set in place in 
the 1980s are widely assigned a role in the trend of increasing 
inequality over the past three decades.60  My focus, however, is on the 
role of inheritance. 
The U.S. law of succession consists of basic freedom of testation 
by execution of a will, along with default intestacy laws that generally 
designate spouses and/or children and/or descendants as primary 
heirs.61  Under this traditional regime, a decedent’s property is not 
transferred automatically, and initiation of a probate process is 
necessary for the official transfer of title.62  This is still true, by and 
large, for intestate estates and real property not held in joint 
tenancy.63  Privatized estate mechanisms such as life insurance, 
payable on death (POD) and transfer on death (TOD) accounts, and 
revocable or living trusts as will substitutes, however, have more 
recently rendered probate unnecessary in many instances64—but only 
where a decedent takes affirmative action to employ those substitutes.  
For a few wealthy decedents, taxes claim a portion of the estate for 
the public coffers, but historically the numbers to whom this applies 
are small—on the order of one percent.65 
 
60 See, e.g., Bill Moyers, The Fight of Our Lives, in INEQUALITY MATTERS, supra note 
29, at 3.  But see WOLFF, supra note 21, at 34 (noting that changes in public policy alone 
cannot explain trends). 
61 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
62 I use the term “title” here to denote proof of ownership, which for real property 
normally takes the form of a formal public record.  See infra note 206 and accompanying 
text. 
63 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 9–10; JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 47 (8th ed. 2009). 
64 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the 
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984) (arguing for the legitimization of the 
main will substitutes as “nonprobate wills” and for unifying the constructional law of wills 
and will substitutes). 
65 Friedman, supra note 1, at 172, 176–77 (noting that, in 1987, only 0.88% of all 
estates had to file a return and that, in 2002, only 1.17% of decedents had taxable estates). 
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Nowhere do these laws speak of the intergenerational replication of 
advantage or privilege.  Sociologists Stephen McNamee and Robert 
Miller observe that: 
the inheritance rules apply equally to all, regardless of privilege.  
But, like laws defining and protecting property, rules of inheritance 
differentially benefit the privileged and not the vast majority who 
stand to inherit little or nothing.  . . .  [I]nheritance systems are a 
major mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of privilege 
and, as such, constitute a central component of systems of 
stratification.66 
Anatole France’s famous axiom makes a similar point: “[T]he 
majestic equality of the laws . . . forbid the rich as well as the poor to 
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”67  
But the operation of the laws of succession is more subtle than that of 
the law France describes.  In his example, the law operates directly on 
poor and rich alike.  With inheritance and wealth inequality, in 
contrast, the law merely creates a framework within which individual 
choices are made, and it is from these choices—operating from an 
initial wealth distribution—that the pattern of continuing wealth 
inequality emerges. 
Individuals, that is, tend to choose to pass their wealth to 
succeeding generations of their own families because of strong 
cultural norms that lead to these decisions in people’s estate plans.68  
When people do not exercise their right to choose, default intestacy 
laws make similar presumptions on their behalf.  The result of these 
individual decisions and individualized applications of intestacy law 
is for the children of wealthy parents to benefit from inheritances 
from their parents.  Children of parents with little or no wealth inherit 
little or nothing.  Wealth travels down the generations within families, 
and, as Friedman suggests, the social structure reproduces itself. 
 
66 Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., Estate Inheritance: A Sociological 
Lacuna, 59 SOC. INQUIRY 7, 20 (1989). 
67 ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 1927) (1894). 
68 Not all inheritances pass to decedents’ children or descendants.  In fact, some 
evidence suggests increasing trends toward a general preference for spouses as 
beneficiaries than was the case traditionally, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 12, though 
some of this wealth is likely to reach the next generation eventually.  Nevertheless, “there 
are strong cultural expectations in the United States for wealth to remain in the immediate 
family through bequests to spouses and children even though such transfers seemingly 
contradict the dominant ideology of meritocracy.”  McNamee & Miller, supra note 66, at 
18. 
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Studies on the intergenerational transmission of wealth confirm 
this phenomenon, though quantifying its magnitude has proven 
challenging.  After all, inheritance is not the sole source of wealth; 
lifetime earnings and savings as well as inter vivos intergenerational 
gifts can also be significant contributors.  Various studies approach 
the issue using different methodologies and focus on wealth at 
different points in the life cycle, which leads to varying estimates 
given that older people are more likely to have received an inheritance 
than younger people.  The range of estimates is wide—from 20% at 
the low end to 80% at the high end of total aggregate wealth 
attributable to inheritance.69  Such figures reaffirm that inheritance 
law, while not cloning the social structure precisely, nonetheless 
serves as a highly predictive mold of the next generation. 
Studies have also examined the effect of inheritances on wealth 
inequality.  As to this more direct focus on the distribution of wealth, 
while wealthier households receive proportionately more inheritances 
and in greater amounts,70 those inheritances account for less of the 
total wealth of the receiving household than of more modest 
households, which receive proportionately fewer and more modest 
inheritances.71  One much-cited study suggests that inheritances 
overall have an equalizing effect over time.72  A more recent analysis, 
in contrast, concludes that inheritance slightly increases wealth 
inequality.73  A shared view is that any changes in wealth inequality 
will occur relatively slowly; at least in the short term, inheritance 
tends to replicate the current, relatively unequal distribution of 
wealth. 
As with statistics on the general distribution of wealth, statistics on 
inheritance show a strong racial skew.  Again, multiple 
methodologies lead to differing descriptions of the phenomenon.  
Spilerman notes that the ratio of non-White to White mean net worth 
declines “from .58 to .14 as one moves to the older age groups,” 
 
69 See Robert V. Avery & Michael S. Rendall, Lifetime Inheritances of Three 
Generations of Whites and Blacks, 107 AM. J. SOC. 1300, 1305–08 (2002) (summarizing 
sources of wealth, methodologies, and studies). 
70 Edward N. Wolff, Bequests, Saving, and Wealth Inequality: Inheritances and Wealth 
Inequality, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 260 (2002). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Norma B. Coe & Anthony Webb, Actual and Anticipated Inheritance Receipts, 
(Boston Coll. Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper No. 2009-32, 2009), available at 
http://crr.bc.edu/working_papers/actual_and_anticipated_inheritance_receipts.html. 
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concluding that “white families are either more successful in saving 
from their incomes, accumulating assets over time, or, more likely, 
they receive larger inheritances from parents, an assessment 
supported by transfer data . . . .”74  More directly, Spilerman notes 
that “African-Americans have a lower incidence of providing 
[intergenerational] transfers and lesser amounts are involved when a 
transfer takes place.”75 
Elaborating on this point, economist Robert Avery and statistician 
Michael Rendall show that, in 1989, 
the distribution of inheritances already received is even more 
unequal between whites and blacks than is the distribution of 
current wealth.  The mean 1989 present value of whites’ 
inheritances received is 5.46 times that of blacks’, as compared to 
3.65 for current wealth.  The overall white mean of $28,177 in 
inheritances and substantial inter vivos transfers constitutes 20.7% 
of their mean current wealth . . . .  The overall mean black 
inheritance of $5,165 constitutes only 13.9% of their much lower 
mean current wealth.76 
Avery and Rendall “estimate that 42.9% of whites, versus 16.7% of 
blacks, have received or will receive a substantial inheritance or 
transfer over their lifetimes.”77  And, “[b]ecause mean inheritances 
received are greater for whites than for blacks, and the white-black 
ratio of mean inheritances exceeds the white-black ratio of mean 
current wealth, then it follows that inheritances received will increase 
racial wealth disparities in both absolute and relative terms.”78 
 
74 Spilerman, supra note 24, at 508 (citations omitted).  Note that Black-White savings 
differentials have not been documented.  DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE 
RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 29 (10th anniversary ed. 2010). 
75 Spilerman, supra note 24, at 515 (“An obvious reason is the smaller wealth holdings 
of African-American families.  But it is also the case that, controlling for parental income 
and for income and wealth, the incidence of receipt of financial aid by African-Americans 
falls well below the white rate.” (citations omitted)). 
76 Avery & Rendall, supra note 69, at 1315, 1318.  A contributing factor to the racial 
disparity is that more Whites than Blacks live in “couple-headed households, giving more 
whites than blacks two sources of inheritances to come into the household.”  Id. at 1318 
(Households are the subject of Avery and Rendall’s analysis.). 
77 Id. at 1319. 
78 Id. at 1318 (emphasis added).  These figures, moreover, only describe inheritances 
already received.  Forecasting prospective inheritances, Avery and Rendall find: 
Whites’ mean discounted prospective inheritances are greater than blacks’ by 
$27,005, in a ratio of 7.46 to 1.  This is a considerably larger ratio than that for 
inheritances already received (5.46 to 1 . . .).  . . .  Thus prospective inheritances 
will have a greater role in increasing absolute and relative white-black wealth 
inequality than have inheritances already received. 
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Overall, Avery and Rendall sound a warning as to the detrimental 
effects of future inheritances on racial wealth equality: 
 We noted earlier that the baby boom generation effectively saw a 
halt in progress toward racial equalization in income, albeit at some 
significant advantage over their parents’ generation.  The larger 
racial difference in the parent generation’s income, however, will 
ultimately come back to increase economic inequality of the baby 
boom generation.  The process by which this will happen, and is 
indeed already happening, is through intergenerational financial 
transfers (inter vivos and bequests at death) from the baby boomers’ 
parents to the baby boomers themselves.  What this process implies, 
then, is that even when earnings gaps are reduced, 
intergenerational transfers will act as a drag on the process of 
equalization of racial economic status.  That racial earnings gaps 
have not narrowed since at least the beginning of the 1980s, 
moreover, means that the effect of inheritances may be to increase 
the racial gap in overall economic status, not just postpone its being 
narrowed.79 
Inheritance, then, contributes substantially to the perpetuation of 
wealth inequality generally and to the perpetuation and likely even 
exacerbation of racial wealth disparities.  The law of succession, 
though not overtly racial, facilitates these outcomes through both 
individual action (testacy) and inaction (intestacy). 
II 
RACE AND WEALTH 
Richard Thompson Ford refers to a “deep inequality” that divides a 
heavily Black, poor America from a more prosperous multiracial 
America.80  Wealth statistics bear out this characterization: wealth 
disparities among Blacks (the ratio of median net worth of the top 
wealth quintile to the median net worth of the bottom wealth quintile 
is more than 100,000 to one) are magnitudes greater than wealth 
disparities among Whites (only ninety-one to one).81  On a similar 
note, the bottom 10% of White wealth-holding families in 2007 still 
held, on average, $100 of net worth while the bottom 10% of Black 
 
Id. at 1331. 
79 Id. at 1334–35 (emphasis added); see also Oliver et al., supra note 13 at 91–92. 
80 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
81 See Yuval Elmelech, Determinants of Intragroup Wealth Inequality Among Whites, 
Blacks, and Latinos, in WEALTH ACCUMULATION AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN THE 
UNITED STATES: CURRENT ISSUES 91, 100 tbl.3.2 (Jessica Gordon Nembhard & Ngina 
Chitegi eds., 2006). 
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families were, on average, $3600 in debt.82  Moreover, 23.4% of the 
bottom quintile of wealth-holding households were Black,83 though 
Blacks compose only 12.1% of the population.84 
A.  Present (and Future) Wealth Effects 
Just a few years after Oliver and Shapiro’s path-breaking study, 
sociologist Dalton Conley offered a different perspective on racial 
wealth,85 with a focus on the tangible results of wealth disparities and, 
more specifically, on the degree to which social outcomes correlated 
to race and/or class.  Conley’s data were striking. 
Conley found, for example, statistically significant differences in 
wealth holdings between Blacks and Whites, even after controlling 
for individual characteristics such as level of education, age, gender, 
and previous income.86  But he also found that, when class measures 
of the respondents’ parents were equalized, the racial differences 
disappeared.87  Further, parental net worth (wealth)—not parental 
education, occupational prestige, or income—was the variable that 
mattered, though the type of wealth was not predictive.88  In other 
words, when Black and White parents had the same net worth, racial 
wealth disparities in the next generation did not appear.  Conley 
concluded that 
the locus of black-white wealth inequality lies in the realm of class 
relations rather than reflecting racial differences per se.  Race and 
class mirror each other with respect to the wealth distribution; 
however, in the end it may be the economically disadvantaged 
 
82 SHAPIRO ET. AL., supra note 45, at 2 fig.2. 
83 John C. Weicher, The Rich and the Poor: Demographics of the U.S. Wealth 
Distribution, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., July–Aug. 1997, at 25, 33 tbl.6, 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/97/07/9707jw.pdf (referring 
to 1992 data; compare to 29.0% in 1989). 
84 Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by 
Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, 
Divisions, and States app. A-1 (Population Div., U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 
56, 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056 
/twps0056.html. 
85 See CONLEY, supra note 74. 
86 Id. at 47. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 47–49.  Conley separated out liquid assets, primary residence equity, business 
value, and other illiquid assets.  Id. at 47–48. 
 470 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 453 
family backgrounds of young African Americans more than the 
color of their skin that hurts their efforts to accumulate wealth.89 
Conley then analyzed the effects of family wealth on three 
measures of well-being: education, income, and premarital 
childbearing.  As to education, Conley found strong wealth effects.  
When high school graduation rates are contrasted only by race, Black 
and White rates are statistically equivalent, but when class differences 
are factored out, Black students have higher net completion rates, 
with parental education, business value, and liquid assets having the 
strongest effects.90  As to college graduation rates, parental education 
and net worth predicted completion of a bachelor’s degree, with 
primary residence equity and liquid assets being of significance.91 
Conley also found parental net worth, parental education, and 
primary residence equity correlated to a greater number of hours 
worked, though there was still a negative racial effect that did not 
disappear when he controlled for class.92  In a more mixed set of 
results, parental income and parental education corresponded to 
higher wages while parental net worth and primary residence equity 
corresponded to lower wages.93  The somewhat blurred picture that 
emerges here is one in which a background of wealth supports 
employment but may depress wages because it allows for offspring to 
choose riskier career paths.94 
 
89 Id. at 49. 
90 Id. at 69–71. 
91 Id. at 72–75.  With respect to education, Conley concludes, “Blacks are not 
disadvantaged in the educational system; rather, they are disadvantaged in the resources 
they bring to the system.”  Id. at 80.  More generally, the conclusion that racially disparate 
outcomes can be explained entirely by socioeconomic status is undermined by Conley’s 
own data with respect to premarital childbearing and social mobility.  See infra notes 95–
96, 98–106 and accompanying text.  Even as to education, other studies paint a more 
nuanced picture than do Conley’s data alone.  See, e.g., Meredith Phillips et al., Family 
Background, Parenting Practices, and the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-
WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 103, 126 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) 
(effects of characteristics of grandparents); William Julius Wilson, Commentary, in THE 
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra, at 501, 505 (effects of controlling for multiple 
socioeconomic factors).  Conley's data do show that economic status is a crucial factor, 
apart from race alone, in determining social outcomes. 
92 CONLEY, supra note 74, at 100–01. 
93 Id. at 97–102.  Somewhat counterintuitively, his data showed that high parent income 
corresponded negatively with the number of hours worked—to a greater degree than race.  
Id. at 101 fig.4.4. 
94 Id. at 104. 
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Finally, Conley documented a racial correlation in premarital 
motherhood beyond class, with Black girls significantly more likely 
than class-comparable White girls to fall into this group—three times 
as likely.95  In terms of specific class and wealth variables, parental 
education and primary residence equity were negatively correlated 
with premarital childbearing.96 
More recent studies have affirmed in particular Conley’s findings 
with respect to the importance of wealth vis-à-vis the next 
generation’s educational achievement.97  Such educational 
achievement serves as both the basis for the educated generation’s 
own wealth production and well-being and the grounding for the 
following generation’s educational success.  The effects of wealth 
thus play out directly and indirectly through families over time. 
In later work, Conley looked more closely at social mobility data—
both intergenerational and intragenerational.  According to these data, 
69% of children whose parents were in the bottom wealth quartile in 
1984 remained in the lower half of the wealth distribution by 1998–
2003.  Conversely, more than 76% of children whose parents were in 
the top quartile remained in the top half—and more than half (55%) 
remained in the very top quartile.98  Conley concludes: “[W]here you 
start out, either as a child or as a young adult, has a large effect on 
where you end up.”99  Overall, after parent education, parent net 
worth is “the single most powerful predictor of opportunity for the 
next generation . . . .  That is, although race, income, job status, and 
net worth all tend to vary hand-in-hand, careful statistical parsing 
shows that it is really net worth that drives opportunity for the next 
generation.”100  Moreover, “it is much easier for individuals to hold 
on to their high wealth levels than for individuals . . . to move into 
high wealth levels.”101 
 
95 Id. at 123.  The order of magnitude of difference is twelve times before controlling 
for class.  Id. 
96 Id. at 124–29.  Conley speculates that reasons for a Black-White difference in this 
category, in addition to class, include cultural and religious factors and a shortage of Black 
men due to their lower life expectancy, disproportionate incarceration, and participation in 
the military.  Id. at 116. 
97 See, e.g., Ron Haskins, Education and Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR 
LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 91, 92. 
98 CONLEY, supra note 74, at 158–60. 
99 Id. at 160. 
100 Id. at 155. 
101 Id. at 159. 
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Parsing these data further, Conley finds “striking” racial 
disparities: “Of whites who were in the bottom wealth quartile as 
twenty-five to forty-five-year-olds in 1984, 44 percent remained there 
nineteen years later.”102  In comparison, “[o]f [African Americans] 
who began in the bottom wealth quartile, more than two-thirds (68 
percent) remained stuck there nineteen years later.”103  Further, 
 [t]he situation appears just as grim in terms of racial inequality 
in downward intragenerational mobility.  Of African Americans 
who were in the top wealth quartile as twenty-five to forty-five-
year-olds in 1984, fewer than a quarter (22 percent) remained in the 
top quartile nineteen years later.  The figure is much larger for 
whites, as 60 percent of whites . . . remained in the top wealth 
quartile nineteen years later.  Moreover, whites did not fall to the 
lower quartiles as frequently as African Americans.104 
These data tell a story that is not as sanguine as that suggested by 
Conley’s first results, for they strongly indicate that something other 
than mere socioeconomic indicators is at play.  Conley suggests a 
couple of reasons: documented greater volatility in wealth (significant 
drops) for Blacks105 and other factors such as racial differentials in 
inheritances.106 
Though not conclusive on many points, Conley’s work is important 
for two reasons.  First, it documents tangible connections between 
wealth and well-being.107  In this regard, Conley reveals that the 
effects of parental wealth on children extend far beyond direct 
intergenerational transfers and encompass key indirect effects such as 
education.  As a recent report on economic mobility concludes, “one 
of the ways family background contributes to the economic success of 
adult children is that relatively wealthy parents can help their children 
 
102 Id. at 160. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 161. 
105 Id. at 156–59. 
106 Id. at 219 n.4.  The mechanism by which inheritances would affect the ability to 
hold onto wealth intragenerationally are not clear.  It may be that lower inheritances for 
Blacks provide less economic cushion in hard times or that higher “negative 
inheritances”—the need to provide for older family members—may undermine middle-
class status.  Further investigation of these dynamics is certainly warranted.  See Oliver et 
al., supra note 13, at 84–85. 
107 Cf. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (focusing on experienced 
human conditions rather than wealth generation per se); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF 
JUSTICE 225–27 (2009) (arguing that economic indicators are justifiable only in terms of 
conditions of human lives). 
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get a good education.”108  The social mobility that is a key part of the 
American ethos is tied directly to parent net worth.  Wealth matters. 
Second, Conley’s work serves as a prism that separates, at least 
partially, the combined light of race-class into two separate beams: 
race and class.  His data do not suggest a “post-racial” society.109  
They do suggest that, while race and class are strongly correlated, 
some of the negative consequences of being Black result 
predominantly from being poor, while others may relate primarily to 
the sociocultural role of Blackness.  Conley’s data also highlight 
wealth as a key aspect of class and suggest that various types of 
wealth may play different roles in social success and well-being. 
B.  Past Sources of Wealth Effects 
Anyone who grows up in the United States is steeped in the social 
construction of race.  We “see” race from a very early age.110  
Though we may be “colormute,”111 we are by no means 
“colorblind.”112 
 
108 Haskins, supra note 97, at 95.  The report continues: 
[I]f it were not for the nation’s education system, it might be more difficult for 
wealthy parents to pass along their income advantage to their children.  Without 
a college education, only 23 percent of the adult children of parents in the top 
quintile themselves make it to the top quintile.  This 23 percent is only a little 
higher than would be expected if the children of wealthy parents were equally 
likely to wind up in all five income quintiles.  By contrast, with a college 
education 54 percent of the adult children of parents in the top quintile 
themselves make it into the top income quintile.  Family background is 
important, but adult children from the bottom can move up if they attain a college 
degree, and adult children from the top risk falling if they do not attain a college 
degree. 
Id.  This refers to income rather than wealth, but it is consistent with Conley’s findings.  
See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
109 See also Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 
(2010). 
110 PO BRONSON & ASHLEY MERRYMAN, NURTURESHOCK: NEW THINKING ABOUT 
CHILDREN 54–55 (2009).  See generally id. at ch. 3 (discussing why White parents do not 
discuss race with their children). 
111 See generally MICA POLLOCK, COLORMUTE: RACE TALK DILEMMAS IN AN 
AMERICAN SCHOOL (2004). 
112 For an introduction to unconscious or implicit biases or associations, see PROJECT 
IMPLICIT, http://www.projectimplicit.net (last visited Dec. 16, 2010) (describing the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT)).  To take the IAT, visit Implicit Association Test, 
UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE, http://www.understandingprejudice.org/iat/ (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2010).  See also Barnes et al., supra note 109, at 995 & n.144. 
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We have so internalized race as a relevant factor in our dealings 
with other people that we do not often step back and recall the genesis 
of race—the reason race as a social category was constructed in the 
first place.  Historian Theodore Allen’s work, The Invention of the 
White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control,113 reminds us 
why and how race was created.  Race was not the incidental or 
inevitable effect of different ethnic groups encountering each other 
and vying for supremacy.  Rather, slavery and then de jure 
segregation were, first and foremost, economic institutions that served 
to enrich White plantation owners originally and then Whites more 
generally.114  The social construction of race was the means to this 
end.115  The creation of two classes of people with significantly 
different statuses based on their personal or ancestral origin—
“race”—broke up burgeoning class solidarity that threatened to unite 
Euro- and African-American bond laborers against the ownership 
class in the late 1600s and early 1700s by attaching “Whites” of that 
class to the economic elite (all of whom were Euro-American) on the 
basis of common ancestry and carefully selected shared privileges.116 
According to Allen, race accomplished this through multiple 
mechanisms that together served to create two classes—one to serve 
and enrich and the other to be served and enriched.117  The general 
approach of racial oppression was concurrently to destroy the original 
social identity of the oppressed class and to exclude members of that 
class from access to any of the oppressing class’s avenues for creating 
social identity.118  So members of the oppressed class were deprived 
 
113 1 THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994). 
114 Allen makes his case with a detailed and compelling analogy to the oppression of 
the Irish in Ireland by the British in the centuries before Black slavery in America.  See, 
e.g., id. at 32–35, 46–47.  Use of the Irish analogy allows analysis of racial oppression 
“free of the ‘White Blindspot’ that Dr. DuBois warned us about.”  Id. at 22. 
115 Allen explicitly asserts that racial slavery “must be understood as a sociogenic rather 
than a phylogenic phenomenon.”  Id. at 23. 
116 Id. at 16–18 (discussing EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN 
FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975)); id. at 21 (discussing LERONE 
BENNETT, JR., THE SHAPING OF BLACK AMERICA (1975)). 
117 Id. at 32 (The hallmark of racial oppression is “reduc[ing] all members of the 
oppressed group to one undifferentiated social status, a status beneath that of any member 
of any social class within the colonizing population.” (emphasis omitted)). 
118 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 38 (1982) (referring to an “overwhelming concentration on the profound natal 
alienation of the slave,” and the social death of the slave that emerges as a “dominant 
theme.”). 
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of political and civil rights119 and denied access to literacy.120  Family 
rights and authority were displaced—through both White male access 
to Black women and the absolute discretion of slave owners with 
respect to whether families remained united or were separated.121  
Finally, members of the oppressed class were, in Allen’s term, 
“declassed”—excluded from membership in any of the normal classes 
of the dominant social order—by, for example, legislation that 
handicapped even free Blacks from competing in the economic 
market by prohibiting them from hiring bond laborers other than those 
of African descent, who were at that time two to three times more 
expensive than bond laborers from Europe.122 
In wealth terms, slavery created a group of people who by 
definition could not accumulate positive wealth—whose personal 
balance sheets may be understood as indicating negative net worth 
given their status as property and the fact that getting to zero required 
the investment of purchasing their own freedom.  Even after abolition, 
restrictions on Black economic enterprise continued under de jure 
segregation; the lid was loosened but not removed. 
Complementing this enforcement of Black economic disadvantage 
were measures that used public resources to create White advantage.  
Even as the Civil War was being fought, the Homestead Act of 1862 
made “public land” in the West available to settlers—though not to 
Black settlers.123  After the Civil War, a short-lived Southern 
Homestead Act opened former plantation lands for homesteading to 
Blacks.124  Racial prejudice and access to the land by Whites resulted 
in large amounts of land ending up in White hands,125 though “by 
1900 one-quarter of Southern black farmers owned their own 
farms.”126  The much bruited “forty acres and a mule” never came to 
pass. 
 
119 Id. at 84–85. 
120 Id. at 84. 
121 See id. at 88–89. 
122 Id. at 83. 
123 Id. at 138–39; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 14. 
124 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 14. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 15; see also CONLEY, supra note 74, at 34–36.  Blacks also faced “the not-so-
subtle threat of lynching or other physical violence if an African-American tried to open a 
business, particularly if the business might compete with white-owned franchises.”  
CONLEY, supra note 74, at 35. 
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In the 1900s, racialized Social Security left domestic workers and 
farmers without old-age financial security,127 benefits under the GI 
Bill were steered to Whites,128 and postwar federal housing and 
transportation policy, which supported single-family housing, 
suburbanization, and “stable” neighborhoods—defined as those in 
which “‘properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social 
and racial class’”129—severely hampered Blacks in building home 
equity through the largest federally supported wealth acquisition 
program of the twentieth century.130 
Oliver and Shapiro use the term “sedimentation of racial 
inequality”131 to refer to the current disadvantage resulting from a 
history of slavery, various forms of state-sanctioned discrimination, 
and institutional racism: 
What is often not acknowledged is that the accumulation of wealth 
for some whites is intimately tied to the poverty of wealth for most 
blacks.  Just as blacks have had “cumulative disadvantages,” 
whites have had “cumulative advantages.”  Practically, every 
circumstance of bias and discrimination against blacks has 
produced a circumstance and opportunity of positive gain for 
whites.  When black workers were paid less than white workers, 
white workers gained a benefit; when black businesses were 
confined to the segregated black market, white businesses received 
the benefit of diminished competition; when FHA policies denied 
loans to blacks, whites were the beneficiaries of the spectacular 
growth of good housing and housing equity in the suburbs.  The 
cumulative effect of such a process has been to sediment blacks at 
the bottom of the social hierarchy and to artificially raise the 
relative position of some whites in society.132 
The crux of Black sedimentation (and its corollary, what we might 
call White skimming) is that the position of each generation has been 
to a significant degree dependent on the position of the preceding 
generation.  Where one generation has wealth—to weather economic 
 
127 CONLEY, supra note 74, at 36; IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 42–50 (2005). 
128 KATZNELSON, supra note 127, at 113–41. 
129 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 18 (quoting U.S. FED. HOUSING ADMIN., 
UNDERWRITING MANUAL ¶ 937 (1938)); see also CONLEY, supra note 74, at 36–37 
(describing how Black homeowners had greater difficultly refinancing during the Great 
Depression because Black neighborhoods were disproportionately red-lined by the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation). 
130 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 15–18. 
131 Id. at 50. 
132 Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
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reverses and health problems, to fund education, to help children with 
down payments on first homes, to support themselves so as not to be 
an economic drain on their families in later years, and finally to leave 
bequests outright at death—the next generation enjoys a leg up.  
Where such wealth is not available, the springs to give the succeeding 
generation an economic bounce go missing. 
The concentration of Blacks at the lower end of the wealth 
spectrum, combined with lesser Black upward social mobility and 
greater Black downward social mobility, represents the current 
manifestation of White economic advantage and Black economic 
disadvantage: Racial wealth disparities and compromised social 
mobility for Blacks are today’s version of yesterday’s segregation and 
the slavery of the day before. 
This economic carry-forward is intertwined with, but separate 
from, the sociocultural aspects of race.  The low economic status of 
Blacks, in this view, is not simply an outcome of race but its raison 
d’etre, though the social stigma of Blackness that was integral to 
slavery’s economic function took on a life of its own that remains 
highly potent today.133  These two aspects of race, moreover, 
reinforce each other: The sociocultural stigma of Blackness leads to 
discrimination that causes or perpetuates economic marginalization; 
the economic marginalization of Blacks leads to outsider status and 
social stigma.134 
Most civil rights law focuses on the sociocultural-stigma-leading-
to-economic-marginalization part of this cycle.  The racial wealth 
disparities discussed here, in contrast, call for action that goes to the 
economic-marginalization-leading-to-sociocultural-stigma arc.  This 
means, I believe, that initiatives to address racial wealth disparities 
should be formulated so as not to simply remedy the issue but to do so 
in a way that lessens the sociocultural stigma.  This brings us back to 
colorblindness and race neutrality. 
 
133 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 952–58 (2006).  Conley’s data speak to the 
continuing power of sociocultural race—even when the economics of race are equalized.  
See supra text accompanying note 91. 
134 As Bell Hooks has observed, “In the United States, one’s class standing then is 
always determined by racial as well as economic factors.”  BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE 
STAND: CLASS MATTERS 135 (2000). 
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III 
THE LAW OF “DEEP INEQUALITY” 
Historically, legal codes overtly denied privilege and imposed 
penalties on the basis of racial categorizations.  The sociocultural 
stigma and economic marginalization strands of race were tightly 
braided together.  Over time, the explicit racial code has been largely 
dismantled, and we have arrived at a place where most law is 
“colorblind.”  Such “colorblind” law, which is deemed 
nondiscriminatory in averred intent, is essentially immune from legal 
challenge, though both social stigma and tangible discriminatory 
effects remain to a substantial degree.  The sociocultural stigma and 
the economic marginalization strands of race are frayed but intact; the 
braid has been loosened but is not undone. 
A.  Race Neutrality: An Obvious Strategy with Nonobvious Attributes 
“Colorblindness” now serves as not simply a defense but an 
offense for those who seek to prevent official actions designed to 
ameliorate racial disparities.135  Though there are both legislative and 
judicial holdover provisions of affirmative racial protection,136 the 
window for such an approach is closing.  Witness Justice O’Connor’s 
statement for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger: 
 We take the [Michigan] Law School at its word that it would 
“like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula” 
and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as 
practicable.  . . .  We expect that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.137 
The trend is toward race neutrality as the accepted and enforceable 
norm for legal action. 
The challenge then is how to reconcile the seeming debility of a 
civil rights law grounded in colorblindness with the realities of “deep 
inequality” such as the racial wealth disparities perpetuated by race-
 
135 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007).  See generally Barnes et al., supra note 109, at 998 & n.156 (arguing that the 
modern incarnation of “color blindness” incorrectly assumes that society is now post-
race). 
136 Continuation of the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act and the 
Supreme Court decision to allow race as one factor in law school admissions decisions are 
examples.  See e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
137 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted). 
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neutral inheritance law described in this Article.  In this regard, Ford 
proposes race-neutral measures designed to target less-well-off people 
overall: 
To fight this entrenched racial inequality, we need to move beyond 
civil rights to an approach that is both more circumspect and more 
ambitious.  We should be more circumspect in blaming racism, and 
hidden racists, for problems with more subtle causes.  But we must 
be more ambitious in directly confronting the decline of inner city 
neighborhoods and the isolation of the urban poor.  And many of 
the reforms needed to improve the ghettos—job creation, more 
effective schools, better public infrastructure—would benefit poor 
and working class people of all races, striking a blow against class 
stratification as well as racial inequality.138 
In a similar vein, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres describe a drive 
to increase the number of Blacks at the University of Texas, the 
state’s flagship public university.139  Advocates for inner city 
majority-minority schools and poorer majority-White rural schools 
joined together in support of a measure to ensure admittance for the 
top students from high schools around the state.140  This race-neutral 
initiative, which operated to the relative disadvantage of wealthy 
suburban and private schools with predominantly White students that 
had been previously dominant in admissions,141 helped to address a 
longstanding racial inequality. 
The key to such an approach is political viability.  In Critical Race 
Theory terms, the issue is “interest convergence,” which asserts that 
legal action to benefit Blacks will occur only if it benefits Whites as 
well.142  While this can be viewed cynically, it can also be seen as 
reflecting greater integration of Blacks into the majoritarian U.S. 
democracy.  After all, political minorities as a general rule have to 
persuade sufficient others to their cause to create a majority if they are 
to put their desired policies in place. 
The irony here is that race-neutral initiatives, which have resulted 
from increasing judicial discomfort with imposing remedies for 
continuing racial inequities and consequent embrace of the 
“colorblind” approach, have pushed civil rights activists to take steps 
 
138 Ford, supra note 2. 
139 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 67–74 (2002). 
140 Id. at 68. 
141 Id. at 72–73. 
142 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522–23 (1980). 
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that reach toward the root of race as it was constructed centuries ago.  
As Blacks and Whites who are disadvantaged begin to make common 
cause, joint interests such as economics can be pursued.  For, as Allen 
notes, racial slavery “was not only ruinous to the interests of the 
African-Americans, but was ‘disastrous’ for the propertyless ‘whites’ 
as well.”143 
As a preliminary matter, two avenues for promoting the cross-
racial healing and alliances necessary to move forward appear 
promising.  The first begins with acknowledgement of group 
differences in the form of racial identities—the diametric opposite of 
colorblindness; when all racial groups are “seen,” the focus can shift 
to exposing and equalizing the power dynamic between groups to 
enable movement toward justice and democracy.  This approach 
recognizes the relevance of groups as well as individuals in 
politics.144  The second, related to the first, takes as its starting point 
the belief that cross-racial relationships at the individual level are a 
practical way to overcome barriers and to build a broader social 
capacity for working together.145  These race-conscious, cross-racial 
strategies in the civic sphere are entirely consistent with race 
neutrality in the legal sphere. 
B.  Using Race-Neutral Initiatives to Reverse the Economic and 
Social Consequences of Race 
If the strategy on the table is essentially to restart the cross-racial 
awareness of common economic interests that slavery interrupted 
centuries ago, the basic numbers are promising.  Though substantial 
racial wealth disparities exist, there is another way to cut the numbers: 
Blacks are disproportionately lacking in wealth compared to their 
representation in the population overall, but the absolute number of 
Whites at the bottom of the wealth pyramid exceeds the actual 
number of Blacks because of the greater percentage of Whites in the 
population as a whole.  Thus, Blacks represent 23.4% of the bottom 
quintile of the wealth distribution, which is approximately double the 
proportion of Blacks in the population overall; but that percentage—
 
143 ALLEN, supra note 113, at 21 (citing LERONE BENNETT, JR., THE SHAPING OF 
BLACK AMERICA 76–78 (1975)).  To the extent that race continues to interfere with 
realization of shared interests, new legal and political approaches that help to bridge across 
that interference are to be welcomed. 
144 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 91–95, 156–
73 (1990). 
145 See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 133, at 963–65. 
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and the absolute number it represents—is still less than half of the 
55.9% White representation in that quintile.146  Twice as many Whites 
as Blacks, that is (55.9% versus 23.4%), are in the bottom wealth 
quintile.  This means that there is potentially a cross-racial class 
constituency for addressing the needs of those at the bottom of the 
wealth distribution. 
Further, the benefits of greater economic equality may extend 
beyond those at the bottom of the economic heap.147  An increasing 
body of work reveals that income inequality has detrimental effects 
not only on the least well-off members of a more unequal society but 
on all members of such a society.  Medical epidemiologists Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, at the forefront of this work, have 
concluded from analysis of data across nations and across U.S. states 
that greater income inequality results in a host of negative social 
outcomes: lower social trust,148 higher rates of mental illness149 and 
illegal drug use,150 shorter life expectancies,151 greater levels of 
obesity,152 lower educational outcomes,153 more pregnancies for and 
births to teenage girls,154 more violence,155 and higher rates of 
imprisonment.156 
The degree to which effects such as those found by Wilkinson and 
Pickett might also result from wealth inequality is unclear.  Just as 
there have been little data until recently on wealth overall, there has 
been very little focus on the social effects of wealth and wealth 
inequality in terms of the various measures of health and well-being 
 
146 Weicher, supra note 83 (referencing the 1992 data).  The 1989 numbers were 29.0% 
Black and 48.8% White.  Id.  Data on the middle and top quintiles were unavailable, but 
numbers for the top 1% of the wealth distribution are 91.2% White (1992) and 94.5% 
White (1989) compared to 0.2% Black (1992) and 0.7% Black (1989).  Id. at 28 tbl.3. 
147 These benefits may extend not only to those in the bottom quintile but also to those 
in the bottom half.  Further, there will likely continue to be a sociocultural bond between 
middle- and upper-class Blacks and Blacks in poverty. 
148 WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 34, at 52–56. 
149 Id. at 67. 
150 Id. at 71. 
151 Id. at 80 (in years). 
152 Id. at 92–93. 
153 Id. at 106 (average literacy of fifteen-year-olds). 
154 Id. at 122–23 (births and abortions per 1000 women aged fifteen–nineteen years). 
155 Id. at 135 (noting increased rates of homicide). 
156 Id. at 148 (prisoners per 100,000 population). 
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considered by Wilkinson and Pickett.157  Moreover, wealth inequality 
may well operate quite differently from income inequality.158  On the 
other hand, the evident importance of wealth in people’s lives 
warrants the kind of attention to the potential effects of wealth 
inequality that has been paid to the effects of income inequality.159 
A final observation made by Wilkinson and Pickett is the low 
degree of social mobility (correlating to high income inequality) in 
the United States: “In fact, far from enabling the ideology of the 
American Dream, the USA has the lowest mobility rate among [the] 
eight countries [compared].”160  Here, income and wealth appear to 
be intertwined.  Two of the indicators that Wilkinson and Pickett cite 
as confirming a directly measured correlation between income 
inequality and lower social mobility are associated with wealth: 
access to education and residential segregation.  In this regard, 
Wilkinson and Pickett note both that public expenditures to equalize 
access to education soften the effects of income inequality and that 
greater income inequality leads to greater residential segregation.161  
As to the first factor, the converse of their point is that, in the absence 
of public expenditures on education, wealth differentials may 
exacerbate the effects of income inequality.  As to the second factor, 
to the extent that residential segregation and associated concentrations 
of poverty decrease social mobility, they may again accentuate 
income inequality. 
It has been widely noted that while higher levels of economic 
inequality exist in the United States than in comparable nations, U.S. 
citizens generally accept this.  The standard explanation is that 
 
157 But see, e.g., YURI ANDRIENKO, CRIME AND WEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIM SURVEYS 17–20 (2003), available at http://www.cepr.org 
/meets/wkcn/7/756/papers/andrienko.pdf (finding that income inequality has a significant 
positive correlation with property crimes, while mean income and individual wealth have 
U-shape form influences on crime victimization).  This paper was given at the Economics 
and Research Consortium, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). 
158 The fact that it is far greater may make its effects less applicable to the population at 
large; and the fact that it is less directly related to consumption may attenuate its practical 
significance.  See E-mail from Richard Wilkinson to author (June 23, 2010, 13:28 CST) 
(on file with author). 
159 Further, as noted above, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, while wealth 
inequality has risen in recent decades after falling for much of the twentieth century, a 
significant proportion of the population does have significant wealth (especially in the 
form of homes and pensions), which argues for there being effects of wealth inequality 
that extend to the population at large. 
160 WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 34, at 159. 
161 Id. at 160–63. 
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Americans tend to believe in social mobility, in the Horatio Alger 
story of those who begin life in poverty achieving success through 
effort and virtue.  The facts, as we have seen, demonstrate that this 
story is much less descriptive of actual possibilities for Blacks than 
for Whites.162  It is also less true for those at the bottom generally 
than for those in the middle.163  Given the fact that Blacks have been 
historically and continue to be overrepresented at the bottom of the 
economic distribution, the question arises: Does widespread 
acceptance of high levels of economic inequality—income and 
wealth—in the United States rest, at least to a degree, on this 
knowledge and a sense of its “rightness”?  If so, a significant part of 
the task ahead is to surface that subconscious equation of how the 
world does look with how it must or should look and to expose the 
ways in which the social construction of race and the negative 
associations with Blackness continue to affect—or infect—us. 
The creation of cross-racial relationships among the economically 
disadvantaged and along the economic spectrum can—
paradoxically—be accomplished only by explicitly confronting race 
and its power, though the purpose is ultimately to defuse the power of 
race.164  Race is so essentially a part of identity in the United States 
that we cannot become fellow citizens across racial lines without 
knowing, understanding, and acknowledging each other’s experiences 
and our shared history.  Even if colorblindness may—at least 
eventually—be an appropriate posture for the law, it may never be 
and is certainly not today an appropriate grounding for civic 
relationships. 
The creation of cross-racial relationships has the potential, over 
time, to create civic alliances that join poor Black to poor White, as 
well as poor Black and White to the wealthier portions of our society.  
In those alliances lies the promise of shared stories and 
understandings from which can emerge new social norms, perhaps 
relating to the distribution of wealth, and new law that reflects those 
norms, perhaps relating to inheritance or to other wealth-related 
aspects of law, such as health care, education, asset building, and the 
 
162 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 160–69.  Data are unavailable to answer 
the question whether Whites and Blacks have different levels of optimism on social 
mobility or acceptance of current levels of economic inequality—income or wealth. 
163 See Haskins, supra note 22, at 54 (“[T]here is ‘stickiness’ at both tails of the wealth 
distribution, meaning that the greatest wealth similarity between parents and offspring is at 
the extremes of the distribution.”). 
164 See, e.g., BRONSON & MERRYMAN, supra note 110. 
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revitalization of neighborhoods.165  Though cross-racial relationships 
will be difficult given our deep social conditioning, they are 
nonetheless possible.  Moreover, they are necessary if we are to move 
beyond the current “deep inequality.” 
Part of the process of deconditioning ourselves is exposing the 
institutional racism of our current law.  With inheritance law, as with 
many other manifestations of institutional racism, facially neutral 
laws can lead to non-neutral, racialized outcomes.  The next step is to 
generate new ideas of law that actively counter the status quo—here 
the perpetuation of racial wealth disparities.166  Such alternatives can 
both highlight the contingency of even long-settled law and stimulate 
conversation about desired alternatives.  In this spirit, I offer two 
proposals for changing current inheritance law.  The first of these 
addresses White advantage; the second addresses Black disadvantage. 
IV 
ADDRESSING RACIAL WEALTH DISPARITIES WITH RACE-NEUTRAL 
CHANGES TO INHERITANCE LAW 
The prior Parts of this Article show that 
(1) wealth distribution in the United States is highly unequal from 
both historical and international perspectives; 
(2) racial wealth disparities are particularly acute; 
 
165 On race as an underlying issue in current policy debates, see, for example, Frank 
Rich, The Rage Is Not About Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2010/03 /28/opinion/28rich.html. 
166 The approach I present here shares much with the critique of “post-racialism” 
articulated by Barnes et al., supra note 109.  I also do not believe post-racialism describes 
reality.  I also acknowledge continued unconscious prejudice and the inappropriateness of 
“colorblindness” as descriptive of reality.  I also note the overwhelming evidence of 
continuing racial disparities in various key social and economic contexts, though I focus 
on wealth and homeownership primarily as it relates to wealth. 
 But my overall perspective on law and social change, see Strand, supra note 4, leads me 
to view the struggle to “un-entrench” racism in our social system, see infra notes 260–61 
and accompanying text, as calling for adaptation and evolution of new strategies when, as 
at the current moment, progress has been made and the situation has been transformed but 
the work remains unfinished, see FUNDI: THE STORY OF ELLA BAKER (First Run/Icarus 
Films 1981) (statement by Vincent Harding).  The approach I present here to address racial 
wealth disparities, which is redistributive in the sense it is used by Barnes et al., see supra 
note 109, at 1000–01, is intended as one contribution to what will hopefully be a rich 
discussion of innovative ways to continue to move forward notwithstanding lesser 
availability in the near term of the Equal Protection Clause as a tool for affirmative 
change. 
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(3) current inheritance law, in combination with individual 
choices, perpetuates wealth inequalities, including especially racial 
wealth disparities; 
(4) a relative lack of Black wealth, part of a “deep inequality” in 
America today, is historically grounded and seriously compromises 
the well-being and social mobility of Black citizens; 
(5) current civil rights law points toward race-neutral initiatives as 
constitutional “safe harbors;” and 
(6) race neutrality can lessen the sociocultural stigma of Blackness 
at the same time that it addresses economic marginalization. 
The two proposals below respond to these imperatives. 
A.  Inheritance as Windfall Wealth (Addressing Advantage) 
The basic structure of our law of inheritance is often said to reflect 
a presumption of freedom of testation: “In one form or another, the 
right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—has been 
part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”167  
Testation, of course, must be actively chosen.  If the freedom is not 
exercised, the default provisions of intestacy law apply.168 
Nor is freedom of testation absolute.169  Enforced spousal share 
provisions generally prohibit disinheritance of spouses,170 and other 
provisions “amend” wills in the cases of pretermitted children171 and 
post-testation marriage and divorce.172  Finally, the estate tax limits 
the freedom of the wealthiest testators to pass on their property.173  
These exceptions do not, however, challenge the essential conceptual 
underpinning of freedom of testation—the idea that a normal part of 
the “bundle” of property rights is designating who will receive one’s 
property when one dies. 
 
167 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987); see also Friedman, supra note 1, at 12, 
14. 
168 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
169 See, e.g., Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717 (“[W]e reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long 
line of cases recognizing the States’, and where appropriate, the United States’, broad 
authority to adjust the rules governing the descent and devise of property without 
implicating the guarantees of the Just Compensation Clause.”). 
170 Friedman, supra note 1, at 15. 
171 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 527–34. 
172 Id. at 305–07. 
173 Friedman, supra note 1, at 14.  When I refer here to the estate tax, I include not only 
the federal estate tax but also inheritance taxes levied by the individual states.  See 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 933–34. 
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Shelly Kreiczer-Levy has proposed that inheritance law in reality is 
“bifocal”: in addition to the standard emphasis on the testator’s 
freedom of testation, socially recognized recipients (usually family) 
also have a “belonging” interest embodied in provisions protecting 
them explicitly as well as, for example, in undue influence cases that 
give unspoken preference to family members.174  Kreiczer-Levy 
proposes explicit acknowledgement of “belongingness” as a value in 
inheritance law, along with, though perhaps not commensurate to, 
freedom of testation.  She asserts that this value arises from a shared 
interest of both testator and heirs in continuity, of which property is 
one concrete symbol.175 
Seen this way, a third value in inheritance law that has been long 
present but not clearly articulated becomes apparent: the public policy 
or social interest in the disposition of a decedent’s property.  The 
familiar cases limiting restrictions on marriage,176 the support 
justification for the enforced spousal share,177 and the redistributive 
goals of the estate tax178 all fall into this category.  What happens to 
property at death, then, is trifocal and reflects equipoise among the 
decedent’s interest in autonomy, the relationships between the 
decedent and his or her likely heirs (Kreiczer-Levy’s 
“belongingness”), and the social meaning of the passage of 
property.179 
If the likely result of allowing present inheritance practices to 
continue unimpeded is the perpetuation and even increase in Black-
 
174 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Riddle of Inheritance: Connecting Continuity and 
Property 26–38 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
175 Id. at 10–26.  Mary Clark’s work identifies three propensities of human nature: 
autonomy, bonding, and the search for meaning.  MARY E. CLARK, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN 
NATURE 57–59 (2002).  Autonomy and bonding are both complementary and in tension, 
and the bifocal interests in law identified by Kreiczer-Levy echo these propensities. 
176 See e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009); Shapira v. Union Nat’l 
Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
177 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 476–77; see also id. at 469–71, 475–76 
(discussing the traditional partnership rationale in community property jurisdictions and 
traditional support practices such as dower and curtesy in common law jurisdictions). 
178 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 172. 
179 A third propensity identified by Mary Clark, the search for meaning or the relevance 
of individual action to a larger whole, is at play here.  CLARK, supra note 175, at 58.  This 
triad of human propensities—autonomy, bonding, and overall meaning or social 
relevance—are all both present and legitimate here, which leads me to reject the extreme 
view that inheritance should simply be abolished.  Such action would privilege the social 
interest but essentially deny the autonomy and bonding interests.  My argument here is not 
that the social interest is the only interest but that it is important and currently 
underprotected in inheritance law. 
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White wealth disparities, there is a significant social interest in 
rechanneling the current intergenerational flow of wealth.  Broadly 
taxing inheritances as windfall income can address the problem of 
entrenched White advantage by redirecting the flow of wealth over 
time.  Currently, middle class wealth—which as we have seen tends 
to be disproportionately White—passes freely at death, enriching the 
next (White) generation.  Taxing inheritances as income to the 
recipients would reach some of the wealth acquired over generations 
by Whites disproportionately—often with government support—and 
would begin to equalize rather than accentuate racial (and other) 
wealth disparities.180 
Taxing inheritances as income would also begin to change the 
“story” of inheritance181 from one in which the estate remains the 
decedent’s property to do with as he/she wishes to one in which 
windfall receipts by some citizens, lucky in their birth, are treated the 
same as citizens who are lucky in other ways, such as by winning the 
lottery.  If law is viewed as a collective story that both arises from and 
shapes social norms, the absence of a tax on inheritances is part of an 
overall (legal and lay) story that people are entitled to pass their 
wealth unfettered.  Conversely, imposing a tax on inheritances moves 
toward a story that people are not entitled to receive windfall 
income—from whatever source (including inheritance)—without 
paying tax.182 
 
180 Cf. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 751, 783 (1996) (endorsing the continued lack of taxation on 
most intergenerational wealth transfers).  Though Black Americans have generally been 
unable to pass wealth intergenerationally, with detrimental effects on Black wealth, Moran 
and Whitford conclude that a “Black Congress would prefer to encourage, rather than 
discourage, such transfers.”  Id.  If free, the continual, untaxed, intergenerational transfer 
of wealth will exacerbate current racial wealth disparities.  As this Article concludes, 
curtailing that freedom is the preferable choice. 
181 See Strand, supra note 4, at 608–30 (describing law as a socially constructed 
collective story that emerges from and is reflected back to the community it governs). 
182 In my view, the best proposal—due to its specificity, practicality, and widespread 
applicability—was articulated two decades ago by Alicia H. Munnell, who was then with 
the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston, and key specifics I set forward here reflect her 
thinking.  See Alicia H. Munnell & C. Nicole Ernsberger, Wealth Transfer Taxation: The 
Relative Role for Estate and Income Taxes, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1988, at 3.  
Note that although Munnell's proposal emphasizes treating inheritances as income, it also 
includes a progressive estate surtax on the very wealthiest estates.  Id. at 5, 10–15.  For 
other proposals and perspectives, see Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance 
Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469 (2007); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs: 
The Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1 (2009); J.D. Trout & 
Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance, Redistribution, and the 
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This shift would tap into a distinct strain in public opinion that 
recognizes that inheritance is at odds with the widely embraced 
American image of equal opportunity.  Surveys, for example, reveal 
that “a large majority of those surveyed recognize inheritance as a 
source of economic inequality.  [In one survey, for example,] when 
questioned about [why people have] wealth, 64 percent responded 
‘very important’ and 29 percent said ‘somewhat important’ to the 
item ‘money inherited from families.’”183 
According to the American ideology of inequality, people deserve 
what they get based on their merit.  But the lived experiences of 
individuals tell them that “it takes money to make money” 
(inheritance), that “what counts is not what you know but who you 
know” (sponsorship), and that fortune smiles on those who happen 
to be “at the right place at the right time” (luck).184 
Americans already know that the equal background conditions that 
make equal opportunity real are inconsistent with the current system 
of inheritance. 
Overall, “[t]he paradoxical nature of inheritance derives . . . from 
the fundamental ideological contradiction between freedom of choice 
at the individual level and equality of opportunity at the societal 
level.”185  Part of what shifting to a personal income tax on windfall 
receipts, including inheritances, accomplishes is to begin to illuminate 
how individual freedom of choice actually denies equal opportunity at 
a societal level—at least in our society as currently configured.186  
The cognitive dissonance is already there.  The proposed approach 
merely brings it closer to the surface. 
 
Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765 (2000); see also Michael Kinsley, The Least We 
Can Do, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2010, at 62, 68. 
183 McNamee & Miller, supra note 66, at 14. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 8. 
186 Note that there are other individual decisions that contribute to the emergence of the 
pattern of continued racial wealth disparities.  Among them is the continued practice of 
“in-race” marriage:  While interracial marriages have risen in recent decades, they still 
constitute only about 15% of all new marriages and 8% of marriages overall (2008).  
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, WENDY WANG & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 
MARRYING OUT: ONE-IN-SEVEN NEW U.S. MARRIAGES IS INTERRACIAL OR 
INTERETHNIC (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/755-marrying-out 
.pdf.  The proposals in this Article assume that interventions regarding where people’s 
wealth goes are more appropriate than interventions regarding whom they marry.  Id. 
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Four features enhance the efficacy of the proposal I make here and 
ruffle complacency with the existing “story.”187  First, a fixed-amount 
exemption should apply to all items to be taxed.188  Different 
rationales lead to different amounts for such an exemption.  One 
rationale would be to exempt everything below a certain level in 
terms of the amount of the decedent’s estate—say, the median or a 
percentage of the median of all estates.  In combination with an 
owner-occupied primary residence exemption, discussed below, this 
would lead to a total lack of tax for most Black estates due to their 
low net financial worth, but it would also lead to no tax at all for the 
many White estates that lie below the specified level.189 
Second, the long-standing practice of exempting unrealized capital 
gains for assets held at death should be eliminated.190  This would 
pull into the fiscal net income that has historically not been taxed.  
This income, moreover, is generally held by those citizens who 
receive income in the form of asset appreciation rather than in the 
form of earned wages—citizens who tend to be on the wealthier side. 
Third, the proposed income tax should distinguish owner-occupied 
residences from other inherited assets.  In particular, owner-occupied 
residences that are passing to either another current occupant or to 
someone who will occupy the house should pass free of tax.  In 
contrast, owner-occupied homes that are sold and the proceeds 
distributed are—to the receivers—just an economic asset and should 
be treated the same as other inherited windfall wealth. 
 
187 The first two are included in Munnell’s proposal.  See Munnell & Ernsberger, supra 
note 182, at 19–22.  The others tailor it to achieve the ends identified here. 
188 Id. at 22. 
189 Munnell’s proposal includes two additional features that address specific practical 
issues resulting from treating inheritances as income.  The first measure, which is to 
provide a combined lifetime exemption for inter vivos transfers and inheritances, ensures 
that the “windfall wealth” nature of both types of transfers is recognized and that they 
differ only in their timing.  Id. at 21–22.  (This comparability is currently recognized by 
the integrated gift and estate taxes.) 
 A second measure, which addresses an issue common in the lottery windfall context, is 
to provide for income averaging to spread the effects of what is generally a one-time 
transfer over a number of years.  The recipient pays income tax but can spread the income 
to potentially access lower tax rates—a result of a progressive income tax system.  While 
this diminishes the increased income tax from the proposed change, the overall tax effect 
will likely be revenue-positive as transfers not currently reached by the estate tax would be 
taxed.  Id. at 22. 
190 Id. at 19–21. 
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Such an exemption recognizes that owner-occupied homes are not 
simply assets; they are also directly consumed by their owners.191  It 
thus makes sense to treat them as continuing family self-support 
rather than as the intergenerational transfer of excess wealth.  Further, 
and going to the issue at hand, this exemption acknowledges the 
disproportionate level of financial assets held by Whites, with Blacks 
holding more of their assets as primary residence home equity.  It also 
acknowledges that Black as versus White families are more likely to 
have multiple generations living together.192  In such 
multigenerational households, the assumption and practice is often 
that when the older generation dies the next generation (or 
generations) will continue living in the family home. 
Fourth, people who inherit owner-occupied homes located in areas 
that were once red-lined (and perhaps also yellow-lined) and that 
were purchased by the decedent or a family member during that time 
should receive a tax credit.  Oliver and Shapiro’s discussion of the 
wealth forgone by Black families who were blocked from purchasing 
homes in predominantly White (green-lined and blue-lined) areas—
which then appreciated in value to the extent of forming the weight of 
solid middle class White wealth today—makes a very specific case 
for the federal government acting to at least in part ameliorate the 
costs that are apparent today from decisions made a generation ago.  
Such a credit would, as with the other aspects of this proposal, benefit 
Blacks to a greater degree than their representation in the overall 
population due to their overrepresentation in these neighborhoods.  It 
would, however, also benefit many others.  For it was not only Black 
families who bought and owned houses in red- or yellow-lined 
neighborhoods; the value of the houses owned by others suffered as 
well.193 
 
191 See WOLFF, supra note 21, at 5–6.  Family-run businesses might warrant similar 
treatment because they also are more than simply assets, but I focus on homes due to their 
specific relevance to the issue here. 
192 PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RETURN OF THE MULTI-
GENERATIONAL FAMILY HOUSEHOLD 7 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org 
/assets/pdf/752-multi-generational-families.pdf (noting that 23% of Blacks versus 13% of 
Whites live in multi-generational households). 
193 The precise amount of such a tax credit might depend on, among other factors, when 
the home was purchased, the relative values of homes in different parts of that 
metropolitan area, and whether services such as curbs, gutters, sidewalks, transportation, 
shopping, and other amenities were historically and are today provided.  Though these are 
often related to local government decisions, those decisions may track the levels of 
investment in neighborhoods—levels determined to a large degree by federal government 
actions.  Further, the existence of such a tax credit could also create an incentive for 
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This is, of course, just an outline of a proposal with details to be 
worked out, but the important points are threefold.  The perpetuation 
of Black-White wealth disparities via inheritance is not inevitable.  It 
has occurred and will continue to occur—but only so long as our law 
of inheritance facilitates it.  Moreover, changes in that law can 
address both White advantage and Black disadvantage while 
conforming to race neutrality in how the provisions are shaped; the 
current proposal applies to all who incurred financial injury regardless 
of race.  Finally, the proposed race-neutral provisions emphasize the 
common economic interest of low-wealth citizens across the board 
and sound another note against the conflation of race and class.194 
B.  Intestacy and the Problem of Evaporating Heirs’ Property 
(Addressing Disadvantage) 
The prior section, like most discussions of the law of inheritance, 
focuses on the treatment of wealth that is identified, acknowledged, 
and claimed.  This can be understood as a top-down view of the law 
of inheritance.  But there is also a bottom-up view, and this view is 
both quite different and much less clear.  This is the view that focuses 
on the wealth of people who are at the low end of the spectrum and 
how that wealth is passed to succeeding generations.  The concern 
here is to preserve that wealth so that families who have worked their 
way onto the wealth ladder, even its very lowest rungs, do not slip off. 
 
potential owners to take actions necessary to clear title.  See infra note 255 and 
accompanying text. 
194 The proposed income tax would begin to reverse the current racial wealth disparities 
because it would reach and apply higher rates to larger transfers of wealth (with greater 
effects on Whites) while reaching fewer and applying lower rates to smaller transfers of 
wealth (with lesser effects on Blacks).  This phenomenon occurs because “taxation will 
tend to erode differences in wealth as long as the money is redistributed to the society in a 
more or less equal way.”  MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE 
GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 193 (2002).  Cf. Kinsley, supra note 182, at 
68–72 (tax similar to that proposed in this Article but to be used for infrastructure and 
paying off the national debt).  The redistributive effects could be enhanced by pairing the 
proposed expanded income tax with initiatives such as providing a fiscal “nest egg” for 
those who might not otherwise have one.  See, e.g., Lora Cicconi, How Far Do Child 
Savings Accounts Stray from the Tax Code?: A Comparative Perspective, 34 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 17, 21–24 (describing Senator Bob Kerry’s “KidSave” plan and related legislative 
proposals); Associated Press, Clinton Proposes $5000 ‘Baby Bonds,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/29/us/politics/29bond.html (reporting on a 
similar proposal made by Senator Hillary Clinton in the presidential campaign). 
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The ways in which the law of inheritance affects those with 
minimal wealth have been little noted.195  Also scarce are descriptions 
of how people with modest wealth experience inheritance and how 
they interact with the current law of succession.  The proposal in this 
section is based on the few academic studies that have been done196 
and on my own conversations with practitioners who represent people 
in this group.197  Further exploration of the experiences and needs of 
these households is essential. 
Unlike people with significant wealth, who are relatively likely to 
exercise the freedom of testation described above, people with fewer 
assets are substantially more likely to die intestate.  Currently, 
somewhere in the neighborhood of a third of U.S. adults have a 
will.198  Wealthier individuals are more likely to have wills,199 as are 
older people.200  And, apropos of the racial wealth disparities that are 
the primary subject of this Article, Whites are more likely than Blacks 
to have wills—32% of Whites versus 16.4% of non-Whites in one 
survey.201  While there are several common reasons given for not 
executing a will (such as not wanting to confront dying or a lack of 
relevant knowledge), a consistent theme is people believing they 
 
195 Compare, in this regard, the exhaustive discussions of the estate tax, trusts, and other 
mechanisms that affect those with significant assets. 
196 There are a few notable exceptions.  See, e.g., Heather K. Way, Informal 
Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113 
(2009). 
197 Interview with Kate Mahern, Director, Creighton Law School Legal Clinic, in 
Omaha, Neb. (multiple dates); Telephone Interview with Mavis Gragg, Attorney, in 
Carrboro, N.C. (multiple dates); Interview with Susan Blumenthal & Tanya Harvey, Bryan 
Cave LLP, & Mark Herzog, DC Bar Pro Bono Project, DC Bar Probate Resource Center, 
in D.C. (June 25, 2010).  For a description of the DC Bar Probate Resource Center, see 
Thai Phi Le, The Pro Bono Effect: A Son’s Battle for His Piece of the American Dream, 
WASHINGTON LAWYER, June 2010, at 38.  I have also benefitted from conversations with 
others who have shared personal or family stories. 
198 Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic 
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 41 (2009) (noting that 68% of Americans were 
without wills); see also Press Release, LexisNexis, Lawyers.com Survey Reveals Drop in 
Estate Planning by Americans in 2009; Ailing Economy Likely Reason (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/press-release.aspx?id=1268676534119836 (noting that 
35% of Americans had wills in December 2009). 
199 DiRusso, supra note 198, at 50–51. 
200 Id. at 51–54. 
201 Id. at 42–45; see also Press Release, LexisNexis, Majority of American Adults 
Remain Without Wills, New Lawyers.com Survey Finds (April 3, 2007), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/press-release.aspx?id=1270146453917826 (noting that 
32% of African American, 26% of Hispanic American, and 52% of White American adults 
have wills or other estate plans). 
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don’t have enough assets (24% of respondents in 2009 and 17% in 
2007).202  More recently, a large number cite the economic downturn 
as a factor.203 
There are distinctive issues that arise when individuals die 
intestate.  These issues relate to both the substance and the process of 
intestacy law.  Before analyzing these legal issues, however, I present 
a fact pattern that I believe from my conversations204 not to be  
uncommon. 
1.  An Heirs’ Property Story 
At some point in time, a married couple purchases a home.  While 
the original owners are both alive, the husband does most of the 
repairs and maintenance on the house, so the cost of upkeep is not 
prohibitive.  The husband then predeceases the wife.  Legal 
ownership and title pass automatically to the wife as the house is, 
most likely, held in joint tenancy.  The now-widow continues to live 
in the house either alone or, frequently, with a child or other family 
members who have already been living there or who move in to help 
care for her as she ages.  This child or other family, of course, receive 
the economic and emotional benefits of living in the family home as 
well. 
The widow/mother/grandmother dies intestate.  Several children 
and perhaps several grandchildren, if at least one child predeceased 
her, are heirs by representation as tenants in common so that each heir 
has a fractional interest in the whole property—which leads to the 
designation “heirs’ property.”  It also means that anyone with an 
ownership interest can bring a partition action, which might well 
result in the sale of the property and division of the proceeds.205 
The value of the house (likely located in a low-value 
neighborhood) may not be substantial, and the house may already 
have been neglected somewhat as the husband aged or after he died.  
This in conjunction with each heir having a small interest leads to the 
 
202 Press Release, LexisNexis, supra note 198; Press Release, LexisNexis, supra note 
201. 
203 Press Release, LexisNexis, supra note 198. 
204 See sources cited supra note 197. 
205 See Way, supra note 196, at 151–56.  These issues are similar to those presented by 
Black heirs’ properties.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to 
Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and 
Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505 
(2001) (discussing how tenancies in common contribute to Black land loss). 
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heirs not claiming their economic share of the home’s value.  Or they 
may regard it as the family homestead with a history worth 
preserving.  All heirs, at least all those present, agree not to sell the 
home to extract its economic value, and the estate is never probated.  
This failure to probate can occur even if the wife has a will. 
In conjunction with the decision not to sell the home, the heirs 
agree that the family member or members who were living in the 
house before the wife’s death can continue to live there.  He or she 
pays property taxes in the original owners’ or owner’s name.  This 
may continue for a substantial period of time or into additional 
generations.  By operation of intestacy law, as time passes, ownership 
becomes more and more fractionated until a number of people, 
perhaps even a dozen or more, have very small ownership interests 
while at the same time having experienced little connection with the 
home or even a complete lack of awareness that they have an interest 
in it. 
At some point, this arrangement, with the house still titled206 to the 
original owner(s) but with legal ownership as heirs’ property spread 
far and wide, hits a brick wall.  Often, the problem is the payment of 
property taxes.  Perhaps the occupant cannot pay, or he or she seeks 
contributions from the other owners, who cannot or see no reason to 
invest in a property from which they receive no benefit.207  Or low-
cost loans are available to fix or improve the home,208 or a reverse 
mortgage to support the occupant is indicated,209 but a lack of clear 
title precludes eligibility.  Or the area in which the home is located is 
being redeveloped and the developer wants to purchase the home.210  
Or disaster hits, and disaster relief is conditioned on proof of title.211 
Depending on the economic incentives, the current occupant—
usually but not always a part owner212—may or may not be able to 
secure the legal assistance necessary to open probate, locate all the 
heirs, and clear title.  While conceptually straightforward, this action 
is often a logistical nightmare: people move away, lose touch, have 
and adopt children, remarry and have more children, have children 
 
206 See supra note 62. 
207 See sources cited supra note 197. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Way, supra note 196, at 157 (discussing the problems after Hurricane Katrina). 
212 See sources cited supra note 197. 
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out of wedlock, go to prison, and die in faraway places without their 
families knowing.  When the economic benefits are relatively low 
(saving a modest home from being lost due to property tax liens), 
legal assistance with estate administration is often unavailable.213  
These cases demand many hours, and the rewards appear minimal—
though they may constitute a significant part of the overall wealth 
holdings of the family.  When the economic benefits are high 
(clearing title to sell the home for a redevelopment project, for 
example), legal assistance may be forthcoming, but legal fees may 
take a substantial percentage of the proceeds from the sale.214 
The final step may be eviction of or abandonment by the occupant, 
repossession for tax liens by the local government, and razing the 
property if deterioration is too far along.  Blighted neighborhoods are 
one result.215  Another is loss to the family of the wealth earned by a 
prior generation.216 
2.  Destructive Effects of Intestacy Law 
This type of situation results from operation of essential aspects of 
the law of intestacy.  First, by virtue of the substantive law of how 
ownership interests pass to descendants—by representation in one 
form or another217—division of ownership is given precedence over 
consolidation and alienability.218  Second, by virtue of the procedural 
law of how title passes in the case of intestate assets, affirmative 
 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Way, supra note 196, at 160–61. 
216 These issues overlap but are not the same as those raised in the context of rural 
property owned in tenancy in common by Blacks in the South.  With those heirs’ 
properties, the primary problem with the operation of intestacy law is that fractionated 
ownership and partition actions can result in a judicially ordered sale rather than actual 
partition, even when it is a developer who has acquired a small interest from a part owner 
bringing the partition action and the other owners want to keep the property.  Way, supra 
note 196, at 175.  The result has been a “rapid decline of African-American land 
ownership in the southeastern United States, in part through partition.”   Id.; see also 
Mitchell, supra note 205; Anna Stolley Persky, In the Cross-Heirs, ABA J., May 2009, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/in_the_cross-heirs/. 
 Way points out that, in contrast to the rural heirs’ property problem, “there has been 
very little analysis of the prevalence and issues created by tenancy-in-common ownership 
amongst low-income homeowners in other settings, such as urban and semi-urban 
communities or areas with smaller non-agricultural homesteads.”  Way, supra note 196, at 
175–76. 
217 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 87–90. 
218 Way, supra note 196, at 158–59. 
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action in the form of probate is generally required for the legal 
transfer of title.219 
Heather Way discusses both of these problems comprehensively, 
identifying the following issues: 
(1) balancing the interests of homeowner-occupants with those of 
other, nonresidential heirs;220 
(2) low-income, low-wealth homeowner-occupants who want to 
stay in the home but cannot afford to buy out other heirs;221 
(3) the role of social interests such as “promoting the upkeep of 
homes, preserving familial and cultural ties to the homestead, 
ensuring the alienability of property, and economic efficiency”;222 
and 
(4) the role of factors such as 
 ? The length of time that an owner-occupant has lived in the 
home; 
? How long a property’s ownership has been fractionated; 
? The number and size of the fractionated interests; 
? Whether an heir has made any contribution to the maintenance 
and upkeep of the land or has any personal ties to the 
property; and 
? Whether an heir is unknown or cannot be located.223 
Way then offers a multitude of proposals for legal reform, which 
she groups into seven areas.  Two of these areas relate to providing 
legal assistance to low-wealth homeowners—before the fact in estate 
planning and after the fact in estate administration—to facilitate the 
passage of title under the current legal regime.224  One area relates to 
reforming housing assistance programs to practice greater leniency 
vis-à-vis proof of title.225  Though Way’s focus is on disaster relief, a 
more common application of this would be in the context of loans by 
local governments and others for property repair and maintenance.226 
 
219 There are a few exceptions.  In North Carolina, for example, “When a property 
owner dies intestate, the title to his real property vests immediately in his heirs.”  Wright v. 
Smith, 564 S.E.2d 613 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-15-2(b) 
(2009).  This procedural assist leaves unaltered the substantive issue of fractionated 
ownership. 
220 Way, supra note 196, at 174. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 174–75. 
223 Id. at 175. 
224 Id. at 188–89, 190–91. 
225 Id. at 189–90. 
226 Id.; see sources cited supra note 197. 
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The other four areas of need that Way discusses relate to legislative 
changes in current state intestacy laws.  Way focuses most of her 
attention on proposals for changing the substantive law that governs 
property inherited through intestacy—with emphasis on ways to 
facilitate consolidation of ownership, primarily for “homesteads 
below a certain market value” that are not “of cultural 
significance;”227 reform of partition laws, with disincentives for 
outside speculators to buy in and protections for a part owner’s 
investment in the property;228 and collective management of property 
through, for example, easier or automatic creation of LLC- or land-
trust-type arrangements.229 
Way also presents several ideas for changing procedural law to 
ease the transfer of title to intestate heirs.  These include creating an 
expedited process for estates in which “the only significant asset in 
the estate is a home of moderate value or less,”230 requiring that 
estates be administered within a certain time of death,231 or easing 
formalities by allowing for affidavits of heirship or even oral 
transfers.232  Way also suggests more general process initiatives such 
as an overhaul of state property record-keeping systems to place a 
responsibility for clearing title with the state233 or a “legal audit of the 
state’s title transfer system.” 234 
 
227 Way, supra note 196, at 181.  Way sets forth five options for consolidation of 
ownership: (1) reforming statutes of limitation and creating a “long-term co-tenant-in-
possession action,” (2) expanding how states define marketable title, (3) allowing 
homeowner-occupants to force sale of other heirs’ interests, (4) allowing courts to clear 
title in tax foreclosure and nuisance abatement actions, and (5) providing government 
assistance for purchasing co-owners’ interests.  Id. at 179–84.  Each of these has strong 
and weak points. 
228 Id. at 184–85. 
229 Id. at 185–88. 
230 Id. at 177. 
231 Id. at 178 (recognizing that this is only fair and feasible if processes are streamlined 
and support is provided to those navigating them). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 177. 
When a property owner dies and no deeds or probate documents are filed in the 
real property records after four years or so, the government could presume that 
the household needs some type of assistance in formalizing the transfer of title 
and then institute more proactive steps to facilitate the transfer. 
Id. at 179. 
234 Id. at 177 (“How accessible is this system to low-income homeowners?  Is there a 
way to better streamline certain procedures?  Is there a way to create more standardized 
legal forms?  Is there a way to increase access to legal resources where needed?”). 
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Way’s analysis and my conversations with practitioners in the field 
illuminate how the intertwined substantive and procedural aspects of 
intestacy law interfere with the smooth passage of modest value 
homes from one generation to the next—a transfer of wealth that is of 
particular importance in keeping families with some but not much net 
worth from losing it between generations, a category that 
encompasses a disproportionate number of Black families.  To begin, 
such homes in such estates are treated the same way as any other 
assets in an estate.  Yet the value of a home is not simply its economic 
value but its consumability.  If it is of modest value and if there are a 
number of heirs so that each heir’s “share” is quite small, does it 
make sense to split ownership?  Doing so will almost certainly create 
a situation in which the transaction costs of probate, including most 
likely the sale of the home and the distribution of proceeds, make 
settling the estate an economically unattractive option.235  Unsettled 
estates result in clouded title with detrimental effects.236 
Intestacy law, and most of the law of inheritance, was developed 
for people with substantial property—people for whom the value of 
the property clearly exceeded the transaction costs associated with 
transfer to the next generation.  As more and more people fall into the 
category of having wealth worth preserving, the traditional system (of 
intestacy and wills—both of which require probate) has become less 
and less satisfactory.  The anti-probate revolution that began in the 
1970s has led to substantial U.S. wealth passing by non-probate 
means.237  The living trusts that Norman Dacey advocated238 may be 
the face of that revolution, but POD and TOD provisions for bank and 
brokerage accounts, life insurance, and other private designations of 
beneficiaries have also grown exponentially.239  The middle class has 
exerted political pressure, and will substitutes, by which wealth 
passes with much greater ease than via probate, have been endorsed—
especially for those with net financial worth.  Those who are stuck 
with probate (even new, streamlined or small-estate probate240) are 
 
235 This may be particularly true for more strapped families with multiple demands on 
their resources—time, money, and energy.  See sources cited supra note 197. 
236 Way, supra note 196, at 156. 
237 See Langbein, supra note 64, at 1108. 
238 NORMAN DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE 13–15 (1965). 
239 See generally Langbein, supra note 64; see also JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2008 
MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING (2007) (describing POD and TOD laws by 
state). 
240 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 44. 
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those whose net worth is in the form of real estate, often consisting of 
only a modest home, and those who die intestate—people who have 
less wealth, who disproportionately happen to be Black.241 
3.  The Importance of Clear Title 
Here is the point at which it becomes all too easy to assign blame.  
Low-wealth homeowners who get caught in this intestacy trap—those 
who fail to make wills or those who do not initiate probate 
proceedings (whether or not there is a will)—serve as one likely 
target.  Attorneys, whose estate planning services are not readily 
available to low-wealth clients and who in most instances avoid 
undertaking estate administration for heirs’ properties, provide 
another.242 
A blame game, however, distracts attention from the fact that the 
intestacy trap, while harming the individuals involved, is also a social 
problem.  I have already referred to some of the consequences of 
clouded title to homes: obstacles to low-rate loans designated for 
upkeep; neighborhood decline and associated problems, such as 
crime; and the loss of the local tax base.  Moreover, the lack of secure 
title goes hand in hand with deficient alienability and limits economic 
value.  Homes without clear title exist in a kind of legal purgatory; 
they are not held illegally, but they are not held precisely legally 
either. 
Economist Hernando de Soto asserts that the reason capitalism has 
succeeded in the West is that our system of law has recognized 
arrangements made “on the ground”243 and responded by altering 
formal property law to accommodate and recognize previously 
informal arrangements: 
The systematization of the laws that underpin modern property 
rights systems was possible only because authorities allowed 
preexisting extralegal relationships among groups on the ground 
sometimes to supersede official laws: “Law both grows upward out 
of the structures and customs of the whole society . . . and moves 
 
241 Id. at 47. 
242 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS 
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 198 (2000). 
243 Id. at 173. 
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downward from the policies and values of the rulers of society.  
Law helps to integrate the two.”244 
In the United States, in particular, “[w]hen confronted in the past with 
widespread informal land holdings that lacked clear title, the country 
has responded by changing the law to legitimize these more informal 
property arrangements.”245 
De Soto focuses on societies in which there is a complete 
disconnect between mandatory law and how things are actually done.  
He finds that a “common denominator [is that people] cannot pay the 
costs of legally obtaining property.”246  The journey to legality, he 
concludes, must be “easy, safe, and cheap.”247  To discover what will 
work, he advises governments not to “hir[e] lawyers in high-rise 
offices . . . to draft new laws [but to] go out into the streets and listen 
to the barking dogs.”248  The goal is to discover the law.  What is 
already happening?  How are people handling things now?  What do 
they need to make things work? 
De Soto’s insight and questions are disturbingly applicable to the 
world of low-wealth homeowners.249  As with other groups 
throughout our history who were not well served by conventional 
property laws, there is a benefit to the society at large in building a 
bridge.  Way notes that in Louisiana “an estimated 15% of the 
homeowners who applied for federal housing assistance after 
Hurricane Katrina—approximately 20,000 homeowners—had 
clouded title, including many homeowners concentrated in the low-
income neighborhoods of New Orleans Parish.”250  Clouded title has 
concrete adverse effects on homes, neighborhoods, and communities. 
But it also, vis-à-vis the overarching topic of this Article, serves to 
both understate and diminish the value of the underlying assets to 
their individual owners.  Homes with clouded title cannot serve as the 
 
244 Id. at 174 (quoting HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION 
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION  557 (1983)); see also Strand, supra note 4, at 611–
15; supra text accompanying note 4. 
245 Way, supra note 196, at 120 (citing DE SOTO, supra note 242, at 107–08). 
246 DE SOTO, supra note 242, at 177. 
247 Id. at 179. 
248 Id.; see also Strand, supra note 4, at 648 (suggesting the need for a voice for those 
“not historically included” in the creation of the law-story). 
249 See Jane Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
137, 158 (2002) (“Informals are . . . disproportionately non-white, immigrant, non-English 
speakers, and female.”). 
250 Way, supra note 196, at 118 (actually Orleans Parish); see also id. at 152 (asserting 
extent of land held this way, especially in areas of “poverty and low education”). 
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basis for home equity loans to finance college educations.  They 
cannot serve as collateral for new business ventures.  They are, in de 
Soto’s words, “dead capital.”251  Clouded title also keeps the owners 
in a shadow world in terms of the law—for estate planning purposes 
and more generally.  It alienates and erodes respect for the law where 
it could embrace and build such respect.252 
In response to this ill, de Soto calls for lawyers to “step out of [our] 
law libraries into the extralegal sector.”253  The necessary empirical 
research I referred to above can respond to this call, but it must 
incorporate inquiries into people’s actual experiences under the 
current legal system, fix problems from past operation of that system, 
and explore how the system might operate differently in the future.  
From these inquiries, in which people adversely affected by current 
intestacy law are given voice, revisions in intestacy law could emerge. 
This discussion has sketched the outline of a race-neutral proposal 
to reexamine intestacy law with an eye to revising it so that it 
facilitates the intergenerational transfer of wealth for families with 
modest net worth, especially when that net worth is in the form of a 
family home.  The overarching goals are the preservation of family 
wealth from generation to generation and, to that end, the facilitation 
of the clearing of title.  These goals should apply both retroactively 
and prospectively, though past and future may call for distinct 
approaches. 
Specific needs, among others that would surely emerge, are (1) 
eliminating fractionated ownership for modest estates with a family 
home as the primary asset, and (2) facilitating intergenerational 
transfer of clear title while protecting against possible inappropriate 
pressure on elderly owners.  As to the first, while facilitating 
collaborative ownership may be a top priority for rural heirs’ 
property,254 aligning ownership and occupancy are likely to be more 
important with other homesteads.  As to the second, current privatized 
will substitutes provide an inherent protection against pressure on 
elderly owners in the form of the interest of the third-party bank, 
insurance company, or other institution in ensuring that the person is 
exercising appropriate and independent judgment in designating his or 
 
251 DE SOTO, supra note 242, at 6; see also Way, supra note 196, at 156 (explaining 
how tenancy-in-common ownership prevents low-income families from refinancing their 
homes). 
252 DE SOTO, supra note 242, at 196. 
253 Id. at 187. 
254 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 205, at 568–72. 
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her beneficiaries.  There is no comparable safeguard for a POD- or 
TOD-type arrangement with real estate because of the nature of the 
property, which may indicate a different approach.255 
As with the proposal in the prior section, these ideas for reforming 
intestacy law provide only a framework.  Both approaches, however, 
rest on the conviction that the perpetuation of racial wealth disparities 
can be slowed and potentially reversed.  Changes in our law of 
succession can accomplish this, and these changes—while 
significant—need not be radical.  Inaction, however, is tantamount to 
acceptance of the status quo.  Overall, race-neutral changes can 
accomplish the desired goal constitutionally and will also contribute 
to an awareness of the common interests of low-wealth families—
both Black and White. 
CONCLUSION 
I started my inquiry with a focus on the distribution of wealth 
generally and on whether our law of inheritance in fact serves to 
reproduce the social structure.  I found that in the United States we 
have high levels of wealth inequality and over generations the rich 
tend to stay rich and the poor tend to stay poor.  Inheritance 
significantly affects the “bottom line” of net worth that is arrived at 
over time. 
I also found notable racial skew to the system.  Whites 
disproportionately have wealth; Blacks disproportionately lack it.  
Moreover, our law of inheritance perpetuates and perhaps even 
accentuates this skew. 
Inheritance and wealth are part of a continuing “deep inequality” 
that isolates low-wealth Blacks from mainstream America—in hyper-
segregated housing,256 in restricted access to education,257 and in 
 
255 The tax credit for homes in previously red- or yellow-lined neighborhoods proposed 
above, see supra note 193 and accompanying text, would provide an additional incentive 
for intestacy heirs to take action to clear title—but only if the mechanisms to do so are not 
cost-prohibitive. 
256 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74–78 (1993) (defining 
“hypersegregation” as a pattern of segregation across multiple distinct dimensions of 
geographic variation). 
257 GARY ORFIELD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES AT 
UCLA, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 
(2009), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education 
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compromised social mobility—what might be considered to be 
meaningful “equal opportunity.”258  Inheritance and wealth may also 
affect even higher-wealth Blacks’ secure grasp of middle-class 
status.259 
In response to these revelations, I set forth two proposals for 
reform of inheritance law to break up the cycle that perpetuates White 
advantage and Black disadvantage.  The first proposal calls for taxing 
inheritances—windfall wealth—as income to those who receive them.  
The second focuses on revising intestacy law to preserve modest 
wealth between generations.  The latter proposal continues a societal 
trend of making inheritance law more workable for those with less 
overall wealth. 
Both of these proposals are race neutral; they would benefit many 
low-wealth families regardless of race, though they would be of 
particular importance to Black families because Black families are 
overrepresented in that group—in large part because of historical 
events and, in fact, inheritance.  The race neutrality of these proposals 
would highlight the common economic interests of low-wealth 
households and take us a step further from the deep-seated race-as-
class system that has prevailed for so long.  Moreover, the mitigation 
of high levels of wealth inequality generally could benefit us all—
regardless of our place in the wealth distribution—given evidence of 
the greater well-being of more equal societies. 
I see the analysis and proposals here as consistent with much 
current thinking on racial reparations.  Charles Ogletree, for example, 
has observed: 
The reparations movement should not, I believe, focus on payments 
to individuals.  The damage has been done to a group—African-
American slaves and their descendants—but it has not been done 
equally within the group.  The reparations movement must aim at 
undoing the damage where that damage has been most severe and 
where the history of race in America has left its most telling 
evidence.  The legacy of slavery and racial discrimination in 
America is seen in well-documented racial disparities in access to 
education, health care, housing, insurance, employment and other 
social goods.  The reparations movement must therefore focus on 
the poorest of the poor—it must finance social recovery for the 
bottom-stuck, providing an opportunity to address comprehensively 
 
258 See supra notes 98–106 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra note 106. 
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the problems of those who have not substantially benefited from 
integration or affirmative action.260 
Ogletree’s insight goes to the fact that the continuing injury of 
slavery and the system of race it spawned lie today in the current 
configuration of our social and economic systems.261  In this view, 
reparations should be designed to recalibrate the system in ways that 
diminish or, ideally, eliminate the relevance of race as a determinant 
of social status.  The challenge is to formulate actions that at the same 
time work to reverse the concrete effects of the past race-based 
system and to dismantle the social construct of race-as-class.  In this 
regard, race neutrality, though often perceived as a confining 
constitutional straitjacket, may actually offer a promising strategy for 
expediting movement forward. 
 
 
260 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Op-Ed, Litigating the Legacy of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
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261 See TATUM, supra note 12, at 7 (defining racism as a system). 
